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Abstract
Status is greatly valued in the real world, yet it has not received much attention from economic theorists. We examine how the owner of a firm can best
combine money and status to get her employees to work hard for the least total
cost. We find that she should motivate workers of low skill mostly by status and
high skill mostly by money. Moreover, she should do so by using a small number
of titles and wage levels. This often results in star wages to the elite performers
and, more generally, in wage jumps for small increases in productivity.
By analogy, the governance of a society should pay special attention to the
status concerns of ordinary citizens, which may often be accomplished by reinforcing suitable social norms.
Keywords: Status, Incentives, Wages
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Introduction

Man is moved by the desire for status. Kings wage war for glory, soldiers give their
lives for honor, and gangsters take lives for respect. Professors publish for prestige.
Children obey to win praise. Students study to get good grades, and sometimes
protest to assert their dignity.1 Athletes train to win medals, and games are played
for the thrill of victory. Donors give more when it gets them publicity. Corporate
executives work hard for promotions. Military oﬃcers strive for titles. Movie stars
seek fame. Everybody wants recognition, and even the ordinary man values his
reputation.
Status appears in the language with such frequency and in so many guises, that it
must be important. Yet in standard economic theory, status is nearly always ignored,
∗
This is a revision, with a slightly altered title, of the second half of Dubey—Geanakoplos (2005).
The authors have recently adopted the convention of alternating the order of their names.
†
Center for Game Theory in Economics, SUNY, Stony Brook and Cowles Foundation, Yale University
‡
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, and Santa Fe Institute
1
Currently across many college campuses in the United States, students are demanding safety
from micro-aggressions.
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and the sole motivation for behavior is taken to be a desire for material consumption,
the sooner and more certain the better.
In many instances status is just instrumental to getting money, suggesting that
the standard theory is not wanting.2 But as the first paragraph shows, status is often
sought for its own sake.3 Achilles became enraged when he was deprived of his booty,
less because of its consumption value but more because of the signal it sent about his
rank. Karna4 viewed honor and status as paramount, donating much of his wealth
and refusing to switch to the winning side in battle, all for the glory of his reputation.
Marlon Brando in "On the Waterfront" laments that in his youthful boxing days he
took a dive for the money when he could instead have fought to win glory: "I coulda
been a contender, I coulda been somebody". J.P. Morgan went so far as to say that
money is just a way of keeping score, acquired in order to get status.
What then is status? We believe that the common theme underlying all our
italicized words is: what one thinks others think of one’s relative rank. Furthermore,
as each of our examples indicates, rank emerges from performance, such as fighting,
publishing, donating, obeying, and studying, but is not identical to it.5 What is
crucial is the categorization of performance, via titles such as winners and losers,
gold medalists and bronze medalists, grades A and B, honorable and shameful, and
so on. Status is the (public) ranking of people induced by a ranking of the titles which
label their performance. These titles (or status categories) could have evolved over
time, perhaps because they encouraged behavior that made the society fitter. They
could also have been created by conscious design, and nurtured by the educational
system for the young, and more generally by the cultural milieu at large. In this
paper we shall focus on the design aspect.
Most societies have used status to motivate their citizens. The ancient Greeks
allocated honorific prizes to the best playwright, the best painter, and the best of
the Achaeans. The French bury their heroes in the Pantheon. The English bestow
knighthood.
The flip side of honor, indeed its negative, is shame or "losing face". The thrill
of victory and the agony of defeat both create incentives for performance. Admiral
Nelson’s exhortation "England expects every man to do his duty" is at once a promise
of honor to those who fight and shame to those who run away.
2

One example of the instrumental role of money is that higher consumption may signal higher
wealth and hence eligibility as a marriage partner (see e.g., Cole—Mailath—Postlewaite (1992, 1995,
1998) and Corneo—Jeanne (1998)). In tournaments, players strive for higher rank in order to get
the corresponding higher monetary prize. See Lazear-Rosen (1981), Green-Stokey (1983), and
Moldovanu-Sela (2001).
3
To quote from James Coleman (1990, pg 130) “Diﬀerential status is universal in social systems...
status, or recognition from others, has long been regarded by psychologists as a primary source
of satisfaction to the self. That is, an interest in status can be regarded as being held by every
person.” See also Coleman (1961) for a discussion of status and its eﬀect on school performance
among adolescents.
4
the tragic hero of the epic Mahabharata.
5
We only consider ranks that are earned; not those which are inherited at birth, such as titles of
nobility, slavery, caste, etc. (The latter, while widely prevalent in the past, are getting eroded with
time, and hopefully on the way out.)
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In modern day labor compensation schemes, we see that many firms use status
to motivate their employees. Titles, like associate, vice president, and managing
director, not only fix organizational roles within a firm, but bestow prestige and rank.6
At a lower level in the hierarchy, many companies such as McDonald’s and Walmart
post pictures of the "employees of the month" to honor their most productive workers.
The general question we seek to answer is, how should the owner of a firm combine
status and money to motivate her employees to work with the least expenditure of
money?7 How many titles should she award? Should she use titles to lower all the
wages, or is it better for her to use titles to lower some wages and actually raise
others? Should she provide status incentives to performers at the top or at the
bottom? Should she focus on honor or on shame?
To answer these questions, we introduce a mathematical approach to status, involving the owner of a firm and her employees, which we believe is novel. (Prior
approaches are discussed in the next section.) We assume that the employees get
utility out of their status in the firm, as well as from their wages. Status is conferred
by titles with which the owner labels their performance.8 We suppose that individual performance or output is objectively measurable and observable to the owner
and to the individual, but not marketable: the employee cannot sell oﬀ part of his
output to another employer. Employees may have diﬀerential abilities, and they can
either work or shirk. Each employee’s expected output is increasing with his eﬀort
and ability, but the actual output depends also on chance. The owner cannot tell in
general whether a particular output was caused by eﬀort, ability, or luck. She can
only observe the outputs of her employees, and on that basis alone must reward each
of them with both a title and a wage.9 We require that rewards be merit-based in
that a unilateral increase in the ouput of any employee cannot lower his reward: his
wage cannot go down, and if his title earlier outranked another’s, it continues to do
so.10
Wages can be public or secret. When wages are public, as in state universities
and government oﬃces in the United States and many other countries, they enable
or force people to compare themselves with each other. Public wages in eﬀect create
titles along with monetary compensation. In our model with public wages, an output
that gets a higher wage necessarily gets a higher title, but we also allow titles to go
6

In fact we shall abstract away from the organizational function of titles, and focus only on the
status incentives created by titles.
7
More generally we could introduce money and status into any non-cooperative game. This is
done by augmenting the game form with monetary rewards as well as a ranking of the players,
both based on the outcomes arising from the actions in the game. See Dubey-Geanakoplos (2017)
forthcoming.
8
Sometimes these titles become known to people outside the firm, especially for the highest
ranked employees, in which case they may gain still more status utility. We discuss this external
status incentive later in Section 6, but for the bulk of the paper, we focus on internal status.
9
We actually allow the employer to award a lottery over wages and titles.
10
If the rewards are lotteries, then by merit based we mean that a unilateral increase in output leads
to a lottery which first-order stochastically dominates the earlier one. The rewards are therefore nondiscriminatory: employees who produce the same output get the same (deterministic or stochastic)
reward.
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up across outputs that are given the same wage.11
Sometimes wages can be secret, as happens in many private institutions, such
as Yale University and the Santa Fe Institute, where there is an unspoken rule that
employees do not discuss their salaries. This gives the owner more flexibility for then,
subject to monotonicity, she can pick wages and titles completely independently of
each other.
We cannot solve for the optimal wage-title schedule in general, though we can
show they always exist. So we carry out our analysis in two polar extremes, with
homogenous workers or with disparate workers, where exact solutions can be computed. Even here the mathematics becomes subtle. Nevertheless, there are common
themes that emerge from both cases.
First, it is evident that the owner should use status as long as it generates incentives to work, since titles cost her nothing to bestow. Firms that ignore status
will have higher wage costs and be less profitable. Money payment need not be
contemplated until status incentives are exhausted.
Yet in spite of their costlessness, it is optimal for the owner to award very few
titles. Even though there may be numerous levels of performance, it would be best
for her not to discriminate among them too finely. She should partition them into
a few broad categories and award titles based on those categories alone. Awarding
more titles would reduce status incentives for eﬀort, and force her to pay higher wages
to maintain the same eﬀort. This is consistent with the remarkably small number
of titles that firms award compared to the number of their employees or the range
of individual performances. As was said, Walmart and McDonalds announce the
employees of the month, in eﬀect creating two titles, i.e., the elite group and the rest;
but they never publicly rank all their employees from top to bottom.
The optimal wage schedule is also a step function, made up of broad wage slabs,
not the steadily increasing curve that would be generated, say, by a piece rate.12
The inevitable consequence is that at the cut points of the slabs, a small increase in
performance will lead to a higher title or a big jump in wage.13 Our results reflect the
reality that in many bureaucracies, both in public and private spheres, employees are
placed in a hierarchy consisting of a few groups, in each of which the wage is roughly
constant despite variations in productivity, and that across these groups, there are
jumps in wages. Our results also suggest (though this is less well documented in
practice) that the jumps in pay across groups might occur without corresponding
jumps in productivity.
One reason for broad categories is that there may well be large intermediate intervals of outputs in which the shirker is ahead of the worker on account of sheer
luck.14 Steadily increasing wages inside such intervals would reward the shirker in11
We easily accomodate the case where wages alone signify title. If two titles are given the same
wage, we could pay the higher title infinitesimally more if we wanted to identify titles with wages.
12
We shall often use the term “wage ladder” for this step function, with each step
referred to as a “rung”.
13
In some cases the optimal cut must be by lottery, so that employees with the same performance
will get radically diﬀerent wages and titles.
14
It would be naive to assume that higher output is always a sign of higher skill and better luck
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stead of the worker; thus optimal wages need to be constant there (since meritocratic
wages cannot fall with output). To ensure that the expected wage of the worker is
suﬃciently above the shirker’s, wages must jump outside these intervals.
A second reason is that broad categories generate higher status incentives for
employees with lower ability by enabling those who work hard to come equal in title
with workers of higher ability, a little like handicaps do. (The diﬀerence is that
handicaps discriminate between people, giving a boost say to minority candidates,
whereas our categories are anonymous.) This becomes important because it is optimal
to use status to incentivize employees of lower ability.
Indeed a central theme of our analysis is that the owner should incentivize high
performers mostly by money and low performers as much as possible by status. This
sounds counterintuitive, since by hypothesis the highest status is earned by the highest performance. But there is no contradiction, since status incentive derives from
the change in status that eﬀort can bring, not from the level of status one winds up
with.
The deeper explanation is that with meritocratic pay schedules, a wage hike between low and middling performance forces a higher wage for all superior performance,
and is therefore very expensive, while the same wage hike between excellent and the
best performance does not necessitate any further raises. Thus the more that status
incentives can substitute for pay hikes at low performance levels, the less the total
wage bill.
This theme comes through very starkly in both the homogeneous and disparate
cases. In the disparate case with secret wages, it is optimal to award just two titles
(member vs non-member) so that all the status incentive goes to the very lowest
ability group. With public wages it is optimal, in both the homogeneous and disparate
cases, to award exorbitant wages to a tiny elite of top performers while using titles
as much as possible to motivate the others.15 This is consistent with the high pay
hikes we see at the top of the corporate ladder for CEOs. Again our analysis shows
that this jump at the very top may not be accompanied by a jump in productivity.
Finally we show that as status becomes more valued by employees, the optimal
wage-title schedule becomes increasingly “star-like”: the percentage hike escalates
more rapidly as we go up the wage ladder.
The analysis we have applied to a firm and its owner may be reinterpreted more
broadly in terms of a society and its governance. Those in power should think careand more eﬀort. This is particularly true when eﬀort must be devoted to mastering multiple tasks.
The low eﬀort employee only gets to the first task; the high eﬀort employee gets to many tasks,
but then is slightly less good at the first task. Imagine a student who studies just one problem and
can get it right 80% of the time, while the high eﬀort student studies both semesters and can get
each of two problems right 60% of the time. The shirker has probabilities (.2,.8,0) of getting 0,1,
or 2 correct answers, while the high eﬀort student has probabilities (.16.,48,.36). (In the language
we shall shortly introduce, the worker stochastically dominates the shirker, but does not uniformly
stochastically dominate him.) The optimal title partition or wage schedule will turn out to be {
{0,1},{2} } in which all the rewards are reserved only for getting both answers right.
15
In fact, when employees have risk neutral preferences for money, it is optimal to award an
arbitrarily high wage with arbitrarily low probability to the highest performances. Existence of an
optimum requires the assumption of a maximum wage beyond which the firm cannot pay.
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fully about how to shape the status categories, through a judicious designation of
titles. They can use cash to induce citizens to obey. They can also coerce citizens through the penal system. But status is a third powerful motivator that they
would ignore at their own peril.16 Status undoubtedly played a critical social role
before money was invented, and even in modern times, money payment need not be
contemplated until status incentives are exhausted.
Many of the examples we gave at the beginning of the introduction involved status
rewards for top end performances. What are the status symbols for the ordinary folk
that the theory suggests should be even more important? We submit that many
social norms are enforced not by monetary rewards, or jail for people who flout them,
but by the loss of status that attends those who break them. Most citizens want the
status of being known as decent or honest even if there is no crime in being indecent,
and even if they are old and beyond the time when a reputation for honesty will help
them financially.

1.1

The Model

The owner of the firm defines a wage-title schedule, mapping the vector of outputs
 = (1    ) ∈ R
+ of her  employees to their wages () = (1    ) and
titles () = (1    ) where each title  comes from a set that has a total order
.17 For the most part we restrict attention to absolute reward schedules, in which
the owner partitions the output space R+ into consecutive intervals. This partition
serves as the common yardstick for every employee’s performance. Each interval is
labeled with a title and a wage, and in keeping with the meritocracy criterion, wages
and titles cannot go down as the intervals go up.
The owner could have considered reward schedules where the wage and title of one
worker depend on the output of the others. The most common would be a relative
reward schedule in which the top 1 outputs are given the highest award, the next
2 the second highest and so on. We prove in Section 4 that an optimal absolute
schedule is better for the owner than any relative schedule, so we may ignore relative
schedules altogether. But there are still more general schedules, beyond the absolute
and the relative, that we do not investigate.
The wage-title schedule is known to all the employees. If employee  works (eﬀort
 = 1) he produces a random output, and if he shirks ( = 0) he produces a diﬀerent
random output with a lower expectation, but without incurring the disutility  of
working. Based on the realizations  = (1    ) of outputs, each employee 
obtains utility
 (   ) =  ( ) +  [#{ :    } − #{ :    }] −  
Every employee  gains  utiles for each person he outranks and loses  utiles for
16

The recent unrest at many college campuses led by students of color protesting miccro-aggressions
and unsafe feelings appears at bottom to be a demand for status.
17
It would be interesting to extend the model to multidimensional outputs and partially ordered
titles.
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each person who outranks him.18 There is some recent evidence that such utilities
are quite prevalent in reality.19
We suppose that utility  for money is increasing and concave. Our results are
most powerful in the risk neutral case when  is linear, for when there is diminishing
marginal utility, it is very diﬃcult to further motivate highly paid employees with
still more money.
The wage-title schedule defines a strategic game among the employees. The goal
of the owner is to design a schedule with the cheapest wage bill such that there is a
Nash equilibrium in which everyone works.
In Section 2 we consider employees of homogeneous (i.e. ex ante identical) abilities, and in Section 3 we consider employees with disparate abilities.20 In both cases
we solve for the optimal title schedule when wages cannot be paid, the optimal wage
schedule when titles cannot be awarded, and finally the optimal wage-title schedule.
For homogeneous workers it turns out that the optimal title schedule remains the
same after it becomes possible to pay public wages as well (and thus there is nothing
to be gained by keeping wages secret). However, for disparate workers, the optimal
title schedule must be adjusted once public wages are introduced (and thus the owner
can exploit secret wages). In both the homogeneous and disparate cases, increasing
performance near the low end brings more status but not much more wages, while
at the high end, there are huge money bonuses for star performers. In both cases,
this "star-like" quality of the wage schedule gets more pronounced as status becomes
more important.
The general case of employees with overlapping abilities – which lies in between
our extremes – is no doubt important, and our framework makes it clear that optimal
wage-title schedules exist in this case as well, though their precise structure is not
investigated here.
Furthermore, for the most part we assume complete information, i.e. each employee knows not only his own ability, but also the population distribution of abilities
of his rivals. In Section 5 we show that our results remain essentially intact with
incomplete information where each employee has a probability distribution on the
abilities of his rivals but does not know their actual realizations.
In the future we hope to investigate which lessons persist if outputs depend to
18

An alternative would be to suppose that status utility comes from being the top dog, or more
generally, is increasing and stricly convex in the number of people an employee outranks. Strict
convexity might arise if higher rank gives higher visibility to the outside world; for example, only the
CEO might enjoy media attention outside the firm. In this paper we are ruling this out, imagining
a closed world in which status utility is derived from the acknowledgment of superior rank by the
other employees; the owner alone is the public face of the company. However our framework can
accommodate such non-linear status utilities, and in particular the existence of optimal wage-title
schedules is not compromised, as we shall show in a sequel paper. The planner will adapt his rewards
depending on how his employees perceive status.
19
See for example the article "Does Wage Rank Aﬀect Employees Well-being?" by Brown, Gardner,
Oswald, and Qian (2008).
20
These two cases were also the center of attention in Dubey-Geanakoplos (2010), in the scenario
where wages were not present, and students were rewarded solely by titles/grades based on their
exam scores.
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some extent on cooperation between the employees that might be compromised by
jealousy, or if there is competition between firms to hire workers, or if performances
and rewards occur repeatedly in a dynamic framework.

1.2

Related Literature

Status has been discussed by many authors from various points of view. There is a
large literature whose pioneers include Weber (1922) and especially Veblen (1899),
who famously introduced conspicuous consumption, i.e., the idea that people strive
to consume more than others partly for the sake of higher status.
A major distinction turns on cardinal versus ordinal utility. One strand of
the literaure adopts a cardinal approach which makes utility depend on the diﬀerence between an individual’s wage/consumption and others’ consumption (see, e.g.,
Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1976), Fehr—Schmidt (1999), and Dubey-GeanakoplosHaimanko (2013)). The ordinal approach makes utility depend on the individual’s
rank in the distribution of consumption (see, e.g., Frank (1985), Robson (1992), Direr
(2001), and Hopkins—Kornienko (2004)). See Auriol-Renault (2008) for a recent survey of the literature, including diﬀerent approaches to the modeling of status. Our
model is in the ordinal tradition.
Another strand starts with the hypothesis that status increases the marginal
utility of consumption. Friedman-Savage (1948) and Friedman (1953) invoke this
hypothesis to study attitudes toward risk taking. Becker et al (2005) use the same
hypothesis to explain how inequality might arise in a Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium. In
our model, we eschew this hypothesis: status does not aﬀect the marginal utility of
consumption.
The novelty of our approach is twofold. First we link status with performance,
rather than with consumption. Goode (1979) explicitly did the same, but without
any formal mathematical model. Second, we partition performance into broad status
categories that are chosen by a planner. Thus large gains in performance may not
necessarily bring more status, in contrast to the earlier literatures on cardinal and
ordinal status, where more (consumption) always gives higher status.
We introduced our model of status in a Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
(Dubey-Geanakoplos (2005)). Moldevanu, Sela, and Shi (2007) considered an interesting variation of our model called "Contests for Status". They used the same
utility function for money and status, and they also envisioned a planner creating status through performance categories as we did. There are, however, several diﬀerences
between the two models, and their perspectives are complementary. They allow for
a continuum of eﬀort levels, where we have only two. Our owner cannot disentangle
eﬀort, ability, and luck, whereas theirs always can (since they assume eﬀort equals
output). Their status categories are based on relative performance, whereas ours are
based on absolute performance; in our context, absolute always outperforms relative
from the owner’s (planner’s) point of view.21
21

A longer catalogue of diﬀerences is as follows. Output in their model is deterministic, while
ours permits randomness (which we call luck). In their model all agents have identical productive
skills, whereas in our disparate model skills are heterogeneous. In their model disutilities of eﬀort
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2

Homogeneous Employees

We first consider the case of  homogeneous, i.e. ex ante identical, employees.
For simplicity suppose that the possible outputs lie in a finite22 set  ⊂ R+ , with
maximum max and minimum min  If any employee works, his output is a random
variable  with density  on , and if he shirks
 with density
P it is a random variableP
 on  For any subset  ⊂  let  () = ∈  () and () = ∈ (). We
suppose that the output of each employee is statistically independent of the others’
outputs regardless of their eﬀort levels.23 The disutility for switching from shirk to
work is denoted by   0 for all employees . Since employees are ex ante identical,
we take  =   =   =  for all employees 
We make the productivity assumption that the worker on average produces more
output than the shirker:
X
X
 () 
()
∈

∈

Without loss of generality, for  ∈  either  ()  0 or ()  0.
We begin by studying absolute reward schedules (P ), where P is the titles
partition and  is the wage schedule. Later, in Section 5, we shall show that relative
reward schedules are inferior.
In the absolute schedule, there is a partition P of  into consecutive cells (intervals) corresponding to increasing titles; P() denotes the cell of P in which 
lies. There is also a wage schedule given by a weakly monotonic function  :  →
[min  ∞) mapping outputs to wages above some stipulated minimum min ≥ 0 If
wages are public, then  must be measurable with respect to P that is constant on
each cell of P, meaning that outputs which get the same title cannot get diﬀerent
wages. The collection of wage schedules that are measurable with respect to P is
denoted W(P). Let Π be the (finite) set of partitions of  into consecutive cells,
are ex post heterogeneous, though ex ante identical, whereas in our disparate model they are both
ex ante and ex post heterogeneous. In their model eﬀort is observable to the owner, whereas in
our homogeneous skill case, the owner cannot disentangle eﬀort from luck. In their model, there
is incomplete information among the employees about each others’ disutilities of eﬀort, whereas we
mostly focus on complete information. They restrict attention to performance on a relative scale,
whereas we concentrate on an absolute scale, after proving that in our context absolute is better for
the owner than any relative scale. Finally, they reach a striking conclusion that the top rank should
always consist of a single employee. This hinges on the assumption that agents are ex ante identical.
Were there sharp ex ante heterogeneities, the conclusion would fail, because eﬀort would not enable
the weak to improve their rank by equalling the strong. Even in our homegeneous case, the highest
cell does not consist of a single output, except under the very special assumption that higher eﬀort
leads to uniform stochastic dominance in performance.
22
If  is a compact interval, we can approximate it by a fine finite grid and then use a limiting
argument to derive the analogous result for a continuum of outputs.
23
We assume independence for ease of exposition. Our analysis goes through with a weaker hypothesis consisting of two parts. (a) If N-1 employees work and one shirks, then the shirker’s performance
g is independent of the workers’ performance, each of which is given by f (which need not be independent from each other). (b) If they all work, their outputs (which can be distributed according to
 6=  ) are ex ante symmetric in the following precise sense: consider an elementary event in which
every person is assigned an output, and another elementary event obtained by permuting the names;
then the two elementary events should have the same probability.
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denoting all possible ways P of allocating titles. Let W denote the collection of all
wage schedules, i.e. the set of all weakly monotonic functions  :  → [min  ∞).
Let (P) denote the status incentive generated by P when  =  = 1, i.e. the
increase in payoﬀ of an employee when he switches from shirk to work, assuming that
all others are working, ignoring money altogether and considering only titles. (The
status incentive for arbitrary  ≥ 0 is then (P)) Clearly his status payoﬀ is 0
when he works, since he comes ahead of his ex ante identical competitors as often as
he comes behind. Therefore, recalling that performances are independent, his status
incentive is simply  − 1 times the negative of his status payoﬀ when he shirks and
faces exactly one competitor who works.
X
X
 ()() −
 ()()]
(P) = ( − 1)[
{∈∈:P()P()}

{∈∈:P()P()}

Let   denote the maximum incentive to work that can be generated by status alone,
i.e.
  = max (P)
P∈Π

As we shall see in Section 3.1, it follows from our productivity assumption that    0
Similarly, given a wage schedule  ∈ W, we can define the wage incentive
X
[ () − ()](())
() =
∈

and the maximum incentive to work that can be created by money alone
  = sup ()
∈W

A popular but naive wage schedule is the piece rate in which () =  for some
fixed scalar   0 If  is linear, the piece rate creates a positive incentive to work
(on account of the productivity assumption). By increasing  the incentive can be
increased to any level desired.24
The piece rate is the first wage schedule that comes to mind, because we are so
used to competitive markets. If the worker could sell pieces of his ouput to diﬀerent
competing firms, then a market price would be established for his output, corresponding to the piece rate. But this logic does not apply to our setting. The worker can
choose among diﬀerent firms (modeled by his participation constraint, which we introduce at the end of Section 2) but having made the choice he becomes an employee
24

More generally, even if  is not linear, we can define a wage schedule ̃() so that (̃()) is
linear in  Indeed, fix 0    (sup∈R () − (min ))(max − min ) Let ̃() = −1 ((min ) +
( − min )) for all  ∈ 
From the productivity assumption, this wage schedule gives positive incentive to work. Hence
   0 Furthermore, if () → ∞ as  → ∞ then we can take  arbitrarily large and the
incentive to work becomes arbitrarily large, hence   = ∞
The piece rate schedule and its adapted version for concave  is simple but not economical. We
shall shortly derive a much less costly wage schedule that gives the same incentive to work.
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and must give his entire output to the owner. As long as they remain with the firm,
the employeess are paid according to the policy set by the owner. As we shall see,
the owner will not want to set a piece rate.
Consider the general problem of selecting the optimal reward (i.e. wage-title)
schedule, taking into account both the status incentives of titles and the consumption
incentives of wages.25

min
P

X

 ()()

∈

⎧
⎨ (P) + () ≥ 
P ∈ Π  ∈ W
s.t.
⎩
 ∈ W(P) if wages are public

The optimal absolute reward schedule turns out to be quite simple for ex ante
identical employees. To find it we break the analysis into two parts. Throughout we
keep   fixed, and examine the solution as  varies.
In Section 3.1 we solve the pure titles problem. We ask how the owner could best
use titles to motivate his employees to work, without handing out any money at all,
i.e., we characterize all partitions P such that (P) =    It turns out that these
partitions can be identified by the easily checked "inside and outside" conditions.
Furthermore, we show that they form a (complete) sublattice of the lattice of all
partitions, with maximal element P ∗ and minimal element P∗  It is evident that
this sublattice is the set of all solutions to the minimization problem above, for each
 ≤   ; and that there are no solutions without wages when      Finally, for
generic   the sublattice is a singleton.
A typical property of optimal partitions is that they are coarse, clumping many
outputs into the same cell: there are far fewer titles than outputs. In fact, only in
the very special scenario where  uniformly stochastically dominates  do we get as
many titles as outputs in an optimal solution.
In Section 3.2 we solve the pure wage problem. We ask how the owner should best
choose a wage schedule when her employees derive no status utility from titles, i.e.,
which  ∈ W solve the minimization problem above when  = 0? Solutions exist
for all  ≤    We show that any solution to the pure wage problem is connected to
the pure titles problem. Every solution  of the pure wage problem is measurable
with respect to the finest partition P ∗ that solves the pure titles problem, and there
exists a solution that is measurable with respect to the coarsest partition P∗ 
Thus the optimal wage schedule gives no more wage levels than there are titles,
and possibly fewer. This is a far cry from a piece rate schedule where wages strictly
increase with each output. The optimal wage schedule is a step function with broad
steps. At the jump points, a small increase in output is rewarded with a huge increase
in wage.
25

We implicitly assume that the output of the worker is so valuable to the employer relative to the
wages he needs to pay in order to get them to work, that he deems it optimal to incentivize everyone
to work.
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This is even more starkly true when employees are risk neutral. In this case, 
can be taken to be a "trigger wage" or "star wage": outputs below a threshold  ∗ are
paid min and those above ∗ get a bonus min +  i.e. we get just two wage levels
no matter how many outputs. Moreover, for generic  and , the optimal wage must
be of the trigger form. In the special case where  uniformly stochastically dominates
, the bonus is given only to the very top element of  and the trigger wage is really
a "star’s" wage.
When titles and wages are combined, the optimal wage-title schedule is achieved
simply by the superposition of the pure titles solution and the pure wage solution
just described, and this is so whether wages are public or secret.26 Since the owner
is trying to minimize the wage bill, he will first try to see how far he can go via
titles alone before putting up money to motivate his workers. We find that for all
0   ≤    it is optimal to choose any partition P that solves the pure titles
problem. No wages are necessary. For     ≤   +    the same titles partition
P can be accompanied by the wage schedule −  that solves the pure wage problem
for disutility  −    It makes no diﬀerence whether wages are public or secret. For
    +    no solution is possible.
When  is concave and satisfies increasing relative risk aversion, we show that as
 increases the optimal wage schedule becomes more and more trigger like. Thus as
society becomes more status conscious, wages become more unequal. We prove these
results over the next three sections.

2.1

Titles Alone

We examine the incentive to work created by titles alone, and ask which P maximizes
(P) Such a P is optimal in the sense that if any other title schedule P 0 ∈ Π gets
employees to work via status incentive alone, so will P To characterize optimal P
we need to recall two notions of stochastic dominance.
2.1.1

Stochastic Dominance

Definition: Let  and  be independent random variables which take on values
in a finite totally ordered set .27 We say that  (stochastically) dominates  on
the interval [ ] ⊂  if Pr( ∈ [ ]) Pr( ∈ [ ]) = 0 or
Pr( ∈ [ ]| ∈ [ ]) − Pr( ∈ [ ]| ∈ [ ]) ≥ 0
for all  ∈ ( ]. In this case we write
 %  on [ ]
In words, this means that no matter at what point  we cut the interval [ ], conditional on both  and  lying in [ ],  is at least as likely to lie in the upper
26

This is surprising because the pure titles partition implements work as a Nash equilibrium in the
N-person game, whereas the optimal pure wage schedule implements work in a one-person problem.
27
As before, we assume without loss of generality that for each  ∈  either Pr( = )  0 or
Pr( = )  0
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segment as  If every cut on [ ] gives a strict inequality, then we say that  strictly
dominates  and we denote it by  Â  on [ ]
With this definition in hand, we can show that    0 Let  ∼  and  ∼ 
denote the stochastic outputs of the worker and the shirker. First note that  cannot
stochastically dominate Pon  otherwise,
P by the "dominance increases expectation
lemma" in the appendix, ∈  () ≤ ∈ () contradicting the productivity
assumption. Therefore there exists a  ∈  such that Pr( ≥ ) − Pr( ≥ )  0
Partition  into two titles: let all outputs less than  be accorded the low title, and
all outputs  and above be given the high title. This clearly generates positive status
incentive, hence    0
A moment’s thought will convince the reader that  %  on [ ] if and only if
whenever [ ] =  ∪  is divided into two disjoint intervals, the left interval  lying
below the right interval , then
 ( ∈ )
 ( ∈ )
≤
 ( ∈ )
 ( ∈ )
This is obviously equivalent to the "betweenness" property
 ( ∈  ∪ )
 ( ∈ )
 ( ∈ )
≤
≤
 ( ∈ )
 ( ∈  ∪ )
 ( ∈ )
In the case of strict domination, these inequalities will be strict.
It will be useful to consider a strengthened form of domination.
Definition: We say that  uniformly dominates  on the interval [ ] ⊂  if 
dominates  on every subinterval [ ] ⊂ [ ]. In this case we write  %  on
[ ].
Uniform domination  %  on [ ] can easily be seen to be equivalent to the
condition that whenever    are consecutive elements of [ ] then
 ( = )
 ( = )
≤
 ( = )
 ( = )
In case [ ] consists of two elements, domination and uniform domination are the
same. But with three elements or more, uniform domination is a strictly stronger
requirement. Strict uniform domination, denoted  Â  is defined just like uniform
domination, but with strict inequalities throughout.
2.1.2

The Optimal Titles Partition

To create the best incentives for work, we need to lower the shirker’s payoﬀ as much
as possible. Thus it stands to reason that we should mask performance in regions of
ouput where the shirker is better than the worker, by awarding the same title throughout; and award titles for superior performance across regions where the worker is likely
to do better. These are reflected in the inside and outside domination conditions of
our first Theorem.
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Theorem 1 (Inside-Outside Condition): Let   denote the random output
of the employee when he works, shirks. Then (P) is maximized over Π at ̄ if and
only if
(i) Inside Domination: Y º X on each cell of ̄

(ii) Outside Uniform Domination:  º  across the cells of the ordered set ̄

(The proof of Theorem 1 and all other omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.)
Given that  and  both lie somewhere in two consecutive partition cells, condition (ii) says that  is more likely than  to lie in the upper cell. But given that
 and  lie in the same cell, condition (i) says that it is more likely that  is to the
right of any cut.
One might have thought that since titles create status incentive and are free to
bestow, the owner should hand out as many titles as he can. However, an optimal
partition often involves masked cells. Indeed we have
Lemma 1 (Coarse Partition): Suppose that    are consecutive outputs and
that
 ()
 ()

()
()
Then  and  must be in the same cell of any optimal titles partition. In particular,
an optimal titles partition can be perfectly fine (and hand out as many titles as there
are outputs) only if  º 
In the special case where the worker uniformly dominates the shirker, we do get
the opposite.
Lemma 2 (Fine Partition): Suppose  º  Then the perfectly fine partition
is optimal. If  Â  then the perfectly fine partition is the unique optimum.
For examples and discussion see Dubey-Geanakoplos (2005, 2010).
The set of all optimal partitions turns out to be a lattice. Recall that the join
of two partitions is the coarsest partition that refines them both, and that the meet
is the finest partition that they both refine. In our case of interval partitions of
totally ordered finite sets, the partitions are easily identified with their cuts, i.e. the
boundary points of the intervals.28 Then the join of two partitions is defined by the
union of their cuts, and the meet is defined by the intersection of the cuts.
28

Formally speaking, a cut is defined by a pair  where  is a last element of one interval and 
is the first element of the next interval.
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Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure): The optimal partitions form a sublattice, under
the join and meet operations, of the lattice of all partitions. Thus there is a unique
optimal title partition P ∗ with the most titles, obtained by taking the join of all the
optimal partitions; this maximal optimal partition is the unique optimal partition
that displays strict inside domination on each of its cells. There is also a unique
optimal title partition P∗ with the fewest titles, obtained by taking the meet of all the
optimal partitions; this minimal optimal partition is the unique optimal partition that
displays strict outside domination. Finally, the sublattice is complete, i.e. it includes
all the elements of the lattice between the meet and the join. Indeed, each cell in
any partition in the sublattice is the union of consecutive cells  from the maximal
optimal partition across which  ()() is constant.
According to Theorem 2, every optimal partition is obtained by consolidating
some of the titles of the maximal optimal partition or equivalently by splitting some
of the titles of the minimal optimal partition. For example, the fewest titles (in the
minimal optimal title partition) might be general, colonel, major, captain, lieutenant,
sargeant, corporal, private. The most titles (in the maximal optimal title partition)
might be lieutetant general, major general, brigadier general, ..., private first class,
private second class and so on.
The proof of Theorem 1 was given in a more general setting in Dubey-Geanakoplos
(2005, 2010). For completeness, and because the proof is so much simpler and possibly
more instructive in the finite output case considered in this paper, we present it in
the Appendix. Theorem 2 is presented here for the first time.
It is worth noting that the lattice is usually a singleton.
Lemma 3 (Unicity of the Lattice): Regarding  and  as vectors in the finite
dimensional set R  the optimal partiton is unique for (Lebesgue) almost all  
2.1.3

Computing the Minimal and Maximal Optimal Titles Partitions

We shall provide two algorithms for computing the minimal optimal partition P∗ .
Once we have P∗ it is straightforward to construct P ∗ .
The First Algorithm for the Minimal Optimal Partition Start with the
finest possible partition of  into singleton cells Trivially this partition satisfies the
inside condition. Proceed inductively as follows.
Given any partition (      ) satisfying the inside condition on each
cell, starting from the right look at all pairs of consecutive cells,    etc.
Take the first pair  in the list for which
 ()
 ()
≥
()
()
If no such pair can be found, then by the inside-outside condition of Theorem 1,
we have an optimal partition; and, by the lattice structure of Theorem 2, it is the
minimal optimal partition.
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Otherwise, combine cells  and  into the bigger cell  ∪  By the merger lemma
in the Appendix, this new partiton must also satisfy the inside condition on each of
its cells. Iterate the process. Since  is finite, the process must terminate. ¥
The Second Algorithm for the Minimal Optimal Partition Let
P
≥  ()
∗
1 = ∈ P
≥ ()

If there are multiple such maximizers, choose the smallest. Then define the rightmost
cell as 1 = { ∈  : 1∗ ≤ }29
Given   define
P
 ≥  ()
∗
+1 =  P 
 ≥ ()
Again choose the lowest such maximizers in case there are ties. Then define +1 =
∗
≤   ∗ } This algorithm terminates in a partition after at most ||
{ ∈  : +1
steps.
It remains to check that the constructed partition satisfies the inside and outside
conditions. But this is evident. If
 ( )
 (+1 )
≥
(+1 )
( )

then by betweenness, +1 would have done at least as well as  in the kth maximization problem, and been lower, a contradiction. This establishes strict outside
domination.
For any cut of  into [  ) ∪ [ −1 ) we must have
 ([ −1 ))
 ([  ))
≥
([  ))
([ −1 ))
otherwise, by the betweenness property,  would do better than  in the th maximization problem. This establishes inside domination.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that we have found P∗  ¥
Algorithm for the Maximal Optimal Partition Given any optimal partition
P it is a simple matter to construct the maximal optimal partition P ∗  Simply look
at all cuts of any cell  in P. If the cut leaves   the same on both sides, make it.
By the splitting lemma in the appendix, the new partition satisfies the inside-outside
conditions. Continue iterating the process. By Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure) the
algorithm can only stop at the maximal optimal partition.¥
29
For this algorithm we depart from the convention we use elsewhere, and number the topmost
cell 1 and the bottom cell K, instead of vice versa.
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2.2

Wages Alone

Now we turn to the classical pure wage problem where employees do not care about
status, but only about money, and hence must be motivated by wages alone. Surprisingly, we find that no optimal pure wage schedule ever pays diﬀerently to outputs
that are accorded the same title in the pure titles solution P ∗  In the pure wage
problem people don’t compare themselves with each other, and only think about the
money they get. In the pure titles problem they don’t care about money, but only
about how they rank against others. Nonetheless, the solutions to these diametrically
opposed problems are in harmony. Indeed, our characterization of the optimal titles
partition vastly simplifies the search for the optimal pure wage schedule.
From now on we shall make the not unrealistic assumption that the disutility of
work is high enough that no employee will work for status alone, by requiring
The Necessity-of-Wages Assumption (Homogeneous Case):
   
Theorem 3 (Compatibility of Pure Wages and Pure Titles): Let  () be
the partition induced30 by any solution w of the pure wage problem
X
min
 ()()
∈W

∈

s.t. () ≡

X

[ () − ()](()) ≥ 

∈

Then P(w ) ⊂ P ∗  Furthermore, there exists a solution w such that P(w ) = P∗ 
The intuition for Theorem 3 is that we can always replace the wage schedule inside
a cell of P ∗ with a constant wage chosen so as to leave unchanged the expected utility
of the worker inside the cell. From the worker’s risk aversion we deduce that this
does not increase the expected wage payment of the owner. Since the shirker strictly
dominates the worker inside each cell, this maneuver strictly hurts the shirker. Thus,
lowering the constant wage inside the cell just a tiny bit more improves the profits of
the owner and still increases the incentive to work.
The next theorem shows that every optimal pure wage schedule pays the minimal
wage for a nontrivial initial segment of outputs.
Theorem 4 (Minimum Wage) Let the maximal optimal titles partition P ∗ consist
of consecutiveP
cells 1   
P  Let  ( ) ≤ ( ) (Clearly there must be one
such  since
 ( ) = 1 = ( )) Then, for every solution  of the pure wage
problem given above, () = min for all  ∈ 1 ∪  ∪  
30

Any function induces a partition of its domain consisting of sets on which it has a constant value.
If the function is weakly monotonic, as our wages are, this partition consists of consecutive cells.
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The intuition for Theorem 4 is as follows. From the outside condition that
 ( )( ) is increasing in , we know that  ( ) ≤ ( ) for all  ≤  Lowering the wage on all these cells to min reduces outlays for the owner and cannot hurt
the incentive to work.
A surprising Corollary of Theorem 4 is that with strict risk aversion, there is a
unique optimal pure wage schedule.
Corollary to Theorem 4 (Uniqueness with Strict Risk Aversion) If  is
strictly concave, then the pure wage problem has a unique solution.
The reason is simple. If there were two optimal wage schedules,  and 0 , then
their average ∗ would be monotonic and would cost the owner the same. By Theorem 4, ∗ would be the same as  0 for every cell with  ( ) ≤ ( ) But for
all other cells, [ ( ) − ( )](∗ )  [ ( ) − ( )](5( ) + 5(0 )) whenever
 6= 0 , showing that the incentive to work with ∗ is strictly higher than the incentive to work of  0 . Thus we can lower the wages in ∗ by a tiny bit and make
the owner strictly better oﬀ.
The next theorem shows that there is always an optimal pure wage schedule that
is measurable with respect to P∗ and pays as before the minimum wage for an initial
segment of cells, but is strictly increasing across all cells thereafter.
Theorem 5 (Wage Structure) Let  be an optimal wage schedule and let its
induced partition  () consist of consecutive cells 1      with associated
wages min = 1     . Let employee utility  be diﬀerentiable. Then for   1
we have
[ ( ) − ( )] ( )
0 (+1 )
=
;
0 ( )
[ (+1 ) − (+1 )] (+1 )
while for  = 1 the = must be replaced by ≥ 

The proof of these formulae is as follows. If +1    min  then we can
consider transferring an expected, infinitesimal, dollar from cell +1 to   or vice
versa. This is tantamount to increasing (decreasing) +1 by 1 (+1 ) dollars and
decreasing (increasing)  by 1 ( ) dollars. The incentive eﬀect is the diﬀerence
between 0 (+1 )[ (+1 )−(+1 )] (+1 ) and 0 ( )[ ( )−( )] ( ) These
are equal if we are at an optimum, explaining the equality. If  = min then the
transfer can only go one way, and we get the inequality.
In fact by the same argument it is possible to prove a stronger version of Theorem
5.
Theorem 50 (Wage Structure) Let  be an optimal wage schedule and let the
maximal partition P ∗ consist of consecutive cells 1      with associated wages
min = 1 ≤  ≤  . Let employee utility  be diﬀerentiable. Then if   min 
we have
0 (+1 )
[ ( ) − ( )] ( )
=
;
0
 ( )
[ (+1 ) − (+1 )] (+1 )
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otherwise = must be replaced by ≥ 
If the two cells are part of a big slab of constant wages, then extend the bottom
cell to the left end of the slab and extend the top cell to the right end of the slab.
Now the owner can profitably adjust the wages across the two parts of the slab if the
equality fails. (Since   is increasing across cells of P ∗  an inequality will induce an
increase in the right part of the slab and a decrease in the left, which does not violate
monotonicity.)
The right hand side is less than 1 whenever  (+1 )(+1 )   ( )( )
Theorem 50 , together with our observation from Theorem 3 that there exists an
optimal wage schedule that is measurable with respect to ∗ , gives
Corollary to Theorem 50 (Wage Structure) There is an optimal pure wage
schedule  that is measurable with respect to ∗ , such that () = min on a nonempty initial segment  ∈ 1 ∪  ∪ ∗ of ∗ , and strictly increasing across those
cells to the right of ∗ 
In the special case when employees are risk neutral towards money (i.e.  is
linear), the equality of Theorem 50 cannot hold if   is strictly increasing from 
to +1 . Hence  = min all the way up to the top cell of P∗  after which   is
constant across cells of P ∗  Thus there is an optimal trigger wage, which is min on
every cell in P∗ below the top cell and min plus a positive bonus  for all outputs
in the top cell. (The lowest element  of the top cell triggers the bonus). This is the
content of Theorem 6 below.
Theorem 6 (Trigger Wage with Risk Neutrality): If u is linear, then every
optimal wage schedule must assume the constant value wmin for all outputs below the
top cell of P∗  For any optimal titles partition P, there exists an optimal pure wage
schedule w of the trigger form that pays min for all outputs below the top cell of P
and a bonus min +  to outputs in the top cell of P, where

≥ [ () − ()]

=P

and  is the lowest output in the top cell of P For almost all  and , this is the
unique optimal wage schedule.
Park (1995) derived a trigger wage for risk neutral workers under the much
stronger hypothesis that  uniformly dominates . He also did not consider risk
averse workers. (He did, however, allow for multiple levels of eﬀort, which under under uniform domination, can be accomodated in our model as well; see the Remark
after Theorem 10). Besides being more general, our approach is also diﬀerent from
Park’s, in that we link the pure wage problem to the pure titles problem whereas he
does not have titles at all.
In the next theorem we ask what happens to the optimal wage schedule when
the disutility of work falls from  to . We shall show first of all, that wages can be
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lowered, i.e.  () ≤  () for all  but once the optimal wage  rises above min 
both jump at exactly the same outputs.
Lemma 4 (Disutility and Wage Jump Points with Strict Risk Aversion)
Let employee utility  be diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. Suppose    are
solutions of the pure wage problem above for disutilities    Then  ()   ()
whenever  ()  min and  () =  () whenever  () = min  If  ()  min 
and    then  ()   () if and only if  ()   ()
From Theorem 3, we can take the optimal wage schedules to be measurable with
respect to ∗ , (and by the Corollary to Theorem 4 these are the only optimal wage
schedules). By Theorem 50  each wage schedules jumps at every cut point of ∗ once
it is past min 
With risk averse employees, we might see a gradual increase in wages as we go
up the productivity ladder. The next theorem shows that as the disutility of eﬀort
falls, the optimal pure wage schedule becomes more trigger like, as long as  displays
increasing relative risk aversion. By more trigger like, we mean that the percentage
increase in wages is always higher for  than for  
Theorem 7 (Trigger-Like Wages with Strict Risk Aversion): Let   . Let
employee utility  be twice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. Suppose in addition
that  displays increasing relative risk aversion, i.e. suppose
−

00 ()

0 ()

is weakly increasing in  Let min ≥ 0 Then  looks more like a trigger wage
schedule than  in the sense that    and  ()  min implies
w ()
w ()
≥
w ()
w ()
with strict inequality if  ()   () and  displays strictly increasing relative risk
aversion.
Increasing relative risk aversion implies that the percentage change in marginal
utility for a one percent change in  is rising in  The proof of Theorem 7 follows
immediately from Lemma 4 and the equality of Theorem 5.

2.3

Titles and Wages Together

Having considered titles and wages separately, we are ready to put them together.
One surprise is that the optimal pure titles schedule need not change when wages are
added. Imagine a pre-monetary society in which workers were motivated by titles
alone. Suppose their disutility of work goes up, requiring further motivation from
monetary wages. Then the optimal wage-title deployment would not alter the titles
whatsoever, but on the contrary, simply reinforce them by paying wages according
to the old titles.
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Theorem 8 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule): Let wages be secret or public.
Let     ≤   +    (If  ≤    wages are unnecessary for motivation and
everybody could be paid min ). Suppose (P ) is an optimal wage-title schedule.
Then P is a solution for the pure titles problem and  is a solution for the pure wage
problem with ∗ =  − (P) in place of . Moreover, for almost all  and , the
partition P is uniquely determined.
Thus with homogenous employees, there is nothing to be gained by keeping wages
secret. Moreover, we should in general expect to see far fewer titles given than there
are outputs, and far fewer wages than there are titles.
These features come starkly to light when employees are risk neutral. There is only
one wage above the minimum, given as a bonus to an elite of top performers. Many
title distinctions may occur below the elite, but all of them are paid the minimum
wage.

Theorem 9 (Star Wages): If u is linear, then one optimal wage-title schedule 
is the trigger wage
½
min
if   
() () =
min +  if  ≥ 
where  is the smallest element of the top cell of P∗ and
∗
≥ [ () − ()]

=P

where ∗ = −(P∗ ) For generic   this is the unique optimal wage-title schedule.
If  uniformally stochastically dominates  then the unique optimal wage-title
schedule gives a diﬀerent title to every output and pays the minimum wage to every
worker who does not achieve the top-most output, and a giant bonus to those who do.
We are now in a position to examine what happens when  rises and society
becomes more status conscious. Our main result is that in the presence of increasing
relative risk aversion, increasing status has the eﬀect of making the optimal wage
schedule more star-like.
Theorem 10 (Status Creates Star-Like Wages): Suppose  is twice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave, and displays strictly increasing relative risk aversion.
Then as  rises and the agents become more status conscious, wages fall and become
more trigger like in the sense (of Theorem 7) that wages always rise by a higher
percentage once they exceed min .
Indeed, the move from zero status to  has the same eﬀect as lowering the disutility
by   and finding an optimal pure wage schedule for the diminished disutility.
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Remark (Multiple Eﬀort Levels) Suppose utilities are linear and agents  have
multiple eﬀort levels 1   −1   with corresponding stochastic outputs 1  −1  
(each with full support on the underlying finite space of outputs) and disutilities 
to switch from eﬀort  to maximal eﬀort  , for  = 1   − 1 Further suppose
that  uniformly stochastically dominates  for  = 1  −1 Then, by Theorem
9, the optimal wage-title schedule that motivates all the agents to put in maximal
eﬀort is the perfectly fine partition with a wage schedule that pays the minimum
wage everywhere except for a bonus  at the top-most output.
Remark (Participation Constraints) Suppose utilities are concave, not necessarily linear. We could add an ex ante Participation Constraint (PC), over and above
the minimal wage requirement, i.e., the (expected) utility any agent gets, from wages
and titles combined, should never sink below some stipulated floor ∗  We can still
prove that every optimal wage schedule must be measurable with respect to  ∗ . To
see this, first note that, when they all work, their (expected) status utility is zero (by
symmetry) and thus the utility they enjoy is just their wage utility. Take any wage
schedule  that satisfies the incentive constraint and the participation constraint.
Suppose  is not measurable with respect to the maximal optimal titles partition
 ∗  Then consider ∗  obtained from from  exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.
By construction, ∗ leaves the worker’s wage utility unchanged, hence ∗ satisfies
the participation constraint. The shirker’s utility is worsened in ∗ compared to 
hence the incentive constraint is satisfied in a stronger manner in ∗  Finally, the
total wage bill is not increased. Thus an optimal wage schedule must be measurable
with respect to  ∗ .

3

Disparate Employee Types

We now turn to the other extreme in which employees have disparate abilities. For the
sake of a more succinct presentation, output distributions are taken to be continuous.
(The case of discrete outputs is completely analogous, but the formulae become
messier).
We imagine disparate employee types  = 1   arranged in order of ascending
abilities, with  employees of type  As in the homogeneous case, their utility for
wage  is given by a common function () and status utility enters as a separable,
additive term. But their abilities are no longer taken to be the same. Assuming
all the others work, an employee of type  produces output continuously distributed
 = [   ] with density  when he works, and on the low
on the high interval 

 



interval  = [   ] with density  when he shirks. Conditional on others’ working,
his output depends only on chance and on his own eﬀort, and is independent of all
   +1   +1 ,
the others’ outputs. We assume that abilities are disparate:   


i.e., an employee of type  + 1 is so much more able than an employee of type , that
he always comes out ahead even when he shirks and the other works. In particular,
the supports of the densities     +1  +1 are all disjoint. This corresponds to a
situation in which the employees can be clumped into distinct groups with widely
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diﬀerent training or experience or expertise. We also suppose that the disutility
  0 for switching from shirk to work can vary across type  (The case when  = 1
is a special instance of the homogeneous employees we discussed in the last Section.)
Figure I depicts the case  = 3
Let  denote a wage function and P a title partition of the output space. The
optimal absolute wage-title schedule ( P) solves
min
P

X Z

 ()()

1≤≤

⎧
⎨   (P) +   () ≥  for 1 ≤  ≤ 
P ∈ Π  ∈ W
s.t.
⎩
 ∈ W(P) if wages are public

¤
£
where Π is the collection of all partitions of the output space 1   into finitely
many consecutive cells; W is the set of weakly monotonic wage functions on the
output space; W(P)
R is the set of  ∈ W that are measurable with respect to P;

the term  () = [ () −  ()] (()) is the wage incentive of  under ; and,
finally,   (P) is the status incentive of  under P when all his rivals are working, i.e.,
the change in his status payoﬀ when he unilaterally switches from shirk to work (we
refer forward to the proof of Theorem 12 in the Appendix, for the precise formulae
for   (P) for partitions P that matter in the optimization).
As in the previous Section with homogeneous employees, it will be useful to
examine first the optimal pure title schedule when wages cannot be paid, and then
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the optimal pure wage schedule when titles cannot be conferred. We pass over these
two cases quickly to get to the interesting interplay between wages and titles that
was absent in the homogeneous case.
We find that the optimal titles partition gives as many titles as there are employee
types, far fewer than the continuum of output levels. Typically the optimal pure title
partition does not give the highest title to all the employees of the highest type, and
allows for the best performers of the lowest type (and in fact all types below the
top type) to gain a title equal to the worst performers among those one ability rank
higher. In contrast, the optimal pure wage schedule has a simple structure: it always
gives the same wage to every worker of type  − 1 along with every shirker of type ;
with the jump in wage from the -shirker to the -worker just enough to compensate
 for his disutility of eﬀort.
In sharp contrast to the homogeneous case, we find that when titles and wages
are allocated together, the optimal titles partition changes; and, moreover, secret and
public wages make for quite diﬀerent solutions. We shall show that when wages are
public, the top ability types should be motivated almost entirely by wages, and hardly
at all by status (though they get the highest status). A tiny group of elite performers
among the top ability type should get astronomical wages. As status becomes more
important, the disparity in pay between the highest types and all the other types
increases; in short, wages become more star-like. On the other hand, we show that
when wages are secret, there should be only two titles, so that all the status incentive
is concentrated on the lowest ability type, and everyone else is motivated by wages.
Until the very end of this section we shall assume that  = 1 As we said earlier,
this is without loss of generality, since it can always be achieved be appropriately
rescaling utilities.

3.1

Titles Alone

Once again titles will be given on the basis of performance as measured by a partition
P of the output space into consecutive cells, as in the last section with homogeneous
workers. Assuming all others are working, the expected status payoﬀ to an employee
when he works/shirks is given by the expected number of people he beats (according
to P) minus the expected number of people who beat him. His status incentive to
work,   (P) is his expected status payoﬀ when he works minus his expected status
payoﬀ when he shirks.
Theorem 11 (Optimal Pure Titles): Suppose there are  disparate types, and
a title partition that gives positive status incentive to work for every employee. Then
there is another title partition consisting of  cuts 1     , with 1 = 1 , and
exactly one cut  in every    ≥ 2 which improves (or leaves unchanged) the
status incentive to work of every employee.
In view of Theorem 11, we may restrict attention to partitions P() defined
R 
by vectors  = (1  2       ) with 1 = 1. Here  =   () denotes the
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 ( ) = { ∈   :  ≥  } Since the density  may be
probability of the upper tail 




zero on some intervals, there may be several  that give upper tails with the same
probability. In this case it is harmless to choose the lowest such cut  ( ) = min{ ∈
R 
 :   () =  } (See the diagram below for a partition with three such cuts.)




Denote by   () the status incentive of  that is generated by P(). 31 In the case
where all disincentives  =  it is natural to maximize the minimum incentive to
work, i.e. to choose  ∈ [0 1] to solve

max min   ()

∈[01] 1≤≤

since this will incentivize everyone to work for the highest possible value of 
Corollary to Theorem 11 Consider the setting of Theorem 11  with 2 ≤ 1 ≤
2 ≤  ≤   Then there is a unique  which achieves max∈[01] min1≤≤   (),
with 1 = 1 and 0    1 ( i.e.,    ( )   ) for all  ≥ 2
Figure II depicts the optimal pure titles partition for  = 3

Remark (Deterministic Outputs and Lotteries) When outputs are deterministic (or can take on only a finite number of values), one can achieve the same eﬀect
31

See the proof of Theorem 12 in the Appendix, for explicit formulae for   ()
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by introducing lotteries on titles. Thus, in Figure II above, suppose all outputs are
deterministic. Then reward the work outputs of agents 1,2, 3 with the following lotteries on titles: A with probability 3 and B with probability 1 − 3 for agent 3; B
with probability 2 and C with 1 − 2 for agent 2; and C with probability 3 = 1
for agent 1. For their shirk outputs award B,C,D to 3,2,1 with probability 1 It is
evident that these lotteries will generate the same status payoﬀs and incentives as in
Figure II.

3.2

Wages Alone

We assume that all agents have the same concave utility function  for wages. We also
assume that  is continuous and strictly monotonic, with () −→ ∞ as  −→ ∞.
If titles confer no status, and the owner must motivate his employees only by wages,
then he must ensure that the wage incentive to work for each employee of type  is
enough to overcome his disutility of working, i.e.
Z
Z
(()) () − (()) () ≥ 
It is perfectly clear what needs to be done. The owner would then simply set  = 1
for all  = 1   and compensate each employee for precisely his disutility when he
switches from shirk to work. Since wages must be monotonic in output, this implies
that an optimal pure wage schedule is a step function which pays 0 on [0 1 ) and 
on [  +1
 ), where 0  1     are defined recursively as follows, starting
with 0 :
0 = min
( ) − (−1 ) = 
(Our assumptions on  guarantee the existence of such a wage schedule for any
min  1    .) Without status, wages rise with ability, but in increments determined entirely by the utility of wages and the disutility of eﬀort. When employees
are risk neutral, we have that the wage ladder starts at 0 = min and jumps by 
at output level   When there is strict risk-aversion (i.e.,  is strictly concave), the
jumps escalate as we go up the wage ladder, compared to the risk neutral case.
Figure III depicts the optimal pure wage schedule for  = 3

3.3

Wages and Titles Together

Once again we ask the question: given that the owner can use both titles and wages
as incentives, how should he deploy them together? As we have just seen, solving for
them separately often leads to very diﬀerent partitions. For example, if  =  for all
 for pure titles and on its boundary for pure wages.
 cuts are in the interior of 
Superposing the wage schedule onto the pure titles schedule, as in the homogenous
case, is in general not possible.
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When wielding wages and titles together, should the owner use money and status
in equal proportions for all employees? Or should he, for example, reserve status
mostly for higher employee types? And does our answer depend on whether the
wages are secret or public?
3.3.1

Secret Wages

The owner’s optimization problem is given below for the case of secret wages. He
seeks to minimize his wage bill, subject to incentivizing everyone to work.
At first glance one might think that the highest type, who will necessarily wind up
with the highest status payoﬀ, ought to be motivated by status, while the lowest type,
who will necessarily wind up with the least status payoﬀ, will need to be motivated
by money. But quite the opposite is true. As we said in the introduction, shame is
the flip side of honor. So status considerations apply at both ends. Furthermore it
is the change in status payoﬀ (or money payoﬀ) upon switching from shirk to work
that counts for incentive, not the absolute payoﬀs.
Since wages have to be monotonic, giving a raise to the bottom end will push
wages up for all, creating a huge wage bill for the owner. It is to his advantage to
make the initial rung of the wage staircase as low as possible. He can achieve this
by incentivizing the lowest type as much as possible via status, so that the wage
incentive needed for the lowest ability employee is small. When wages are secret, the
employer can indeed concentrate all the status incentive on the lowest type.
We require
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The Necessity-of-Wages Assumption (Disparate Case):
At any feasible wage-title schedule ( ) each agent must get a positive wage
incentive (in addition to his status incentive)32 .

Theorem 12 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule with Secret Wages and Risk
Neutrality) Suppose there are  disparate risk-neutral types. Then the optimal
wage-title schedule, when wages can be kept secret, has just two titles, the low title for
outputs below 1 (that would be given to a person of the lowest type were he to shirk)
and the high title for all outputs above 1 . Thus despite the freedom to hand out
titles costlessly, that would increase total status incentives, the owner should award
every worker the same high title. All workers above those of type 1 are incentivized
by the secret wages alone. So the wage schedule is a step function where the jump
from −1 to  takes place at  and
0 = min
1 = 0 + 1 − (1 − 1 + 2 +  +  )
 = −1 + 

This solution is reminescent of a club, whose membership is restricted to those
who produce output above a threshhold, but once in, all members enjoy the same
title (even though they may secretly be getting diﬀerent perquisites).
We saw that the optimal pure wage schedule is a ladder. In the risk neutral
case, the optimal secret wage schedule with titles is exactly the same except that the
whole wage ladder is shifted down by (1 − 1 + 2 +  +  ), which is equal to the
enormous status incentive created for the lowest type by the two titles (the shirker
of the lowest type getting the low title and all other outputs the high title). In short,
the lowest type is incentivized as much as possible by status, while the others are
motivated by wages alone.
Figure IV depicts the optimal Wage-Titles Schedule with secret wages for  = 3

3.3.2

Public Wages

The owner’s optimization problem is exactly the same as for secret wages, except for
the added constraint that wages must be measurable with respect to titles, i.e., must
be constant across all outputs that are awarded the same title.
We shall see that, unlike the case of homogeneous employees, the optimal reward
schedule does not arise by a simple superposition of the solutions for titles alone and
wages alone. There is a more intricate interplay between wages and titles. Wages
will now depend on the population distribution of employees 1    , as well as
32

This is guaranteed if, for example, −1 +  + +1   for all  (with 0 = +1 = 0). Would
anybody work for free, just for the status of coming ahead of all his peers?
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the disutilities of eﬀort 1    . But some features stand out independent of the 
and   The most dramatic change to the wage schedule is that now a tiny elite of
top performers will be given exorbitant wages. The title partition will also change.
For 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 it is optimal to set  = 1 so that each of those types surely gets a
higher title by working. Thus the cells  of the optimal title partition are as follows:
−1
 ∪  +1  and 



0 = 1 and, for 1 ≤  ≤  − 2  = 
−1 =  ∪  ∪ [ \ ( )]



and  =  ( ) The set  =  ( ) includes just the outputs at the top end of
 whose probability is   In the optimal public-wage & title schedule,  is not 1



but is close to 0 meaning that only a tiny fraction consisting of the ultra productive
employees of type  will be awarded the topmost title when they work, while the
majority of them will be pooled with the second best type  − 1 The optimal publicwage & title schedule is thus vastly diﬀerent from the optimal pure titles schedule
and from the optimal pure wage schedule.
Figure V depicts the optimal Wage-Titles Schedule with public wages for  = 3
The CEO is picked by lottery from the senior managing directors (type ) Contrary to what one might have guessed, the type  workers are motivated almost
entirely by the chance of the huge money payoﬀ of the CEO and not by status. On
the other hand, the very next tier of managing directors (type  − 1) are motivated
heavily by titles. Unlike all the other workers, by working hard they will come equal
not just with all of their own type but also with virtually all of the type above them.
To sum up, the top tier is motivated by money, the next is motivated as much as
possible by status, and the rest by an even mix of status and money.
To ease the formal exposition of the foregoing discussion, we make the
29
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Diﬀerentiability Assumption:
 is continuously diﬀerentiable33 (in addition to being concave and strictly monotonic).
More substantially we shall assume that agents become risk-neutral when their
wealth is suﬃciently large. Precisely, we have the condition below (which is automatically satisfied when  is linear):
Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption:
(1)  becomes asymptotically risk-neutral ,i.e., the derivative 0 () =  for some
constant  whenever  exceeds a threshold  
(2) −2   at any feasible wage-title schedule ( )
Part (2) requires disutilities to be suﬃciently more than status incentives (cumulatively across the types) so that, by the time the first −2 agents have been given the
requisite wage increases, the threshold  is crossed. Note that if  = (1    ) −→
∞then  = (1    ) −→ ∞ in order to keep ( ) feasible; so (2) is automatic
for large enough  Tighter suﬃcient conditions can easily be stated in terms of the
exogenous data   ( )=1 of the model in order to guarantee (2), but we leave this
to the reader.
Finally we assume that wages are bounded above. We did not need such an
assumption previously, but the possibility of paying an arbitrarily large wage with
very small probability has now become relevant.
33

This is not essential and Theorem 12 below holds with just concavity of  Its proof is exactly
the same but with left (right) derivatives of  used to estimate decreases (increases) in 
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Maximum Wage Assumption:
P Wages can never exceed  where  is large enough so that ( ) − (min ) 
risk neutrality assumption holds, assume  is large
=1   In case the asymptotic
P
enough that ( − min )  =1  

Theorem 13 (Exorbitant Elite Wages): Let there be  disparate types of workers, with  ≥ 1 of each type  = 1  . Suppose the Necessity of Wages and the
Diﬀerentiability and the Maximum Wage Assumptions hold. Then at any optimal
wage-title schedule ( ) we have  = 1 for all  = 1   − 1, so that any two
workers of the same type below  get the same status and wage.
Next assume that the Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption also holds. Then
there
P is a unique optimal status partition and wage schedule ( ), with  ≤ (min +
=1  )  1, and  =  . Thus for large  ,  is very small and a tiny elite
  out of the highest type  is paid the exorbitant salary  , while the rest of their
type obtain the same status and pay as type −1. Thus type  employees are motivated
almost entirely by wages alone.
Theorem 13 gives an explanation for the exorbitant pay often seen at the very
top of some real world hierarchies. It is cheaper to incentivize the managing directors
of type  − 1 as much as possible via status rather than wages. To achieve this they
must be able to get the same status as most of the senior managing directors of
type , if they work hard. This fixes the wage of the latter group at the managing
director’s level. In order to incentivize the senior managing directors, they are given
to understand that the CEO will be chosen from among their rank, and even though
the chance of getting selected is small, the salary is huge. (Denoting the probability
of getting the top CEO title by  the status incentive of type  is (−1 + (1 − ) )
which is negligible compared to the wage incentive  where  is the huge bonus.)
The conclusion is that the top ability group is motivated almost entirely by wages
alone.
This stratagem of paying a huge salary to the tiny fraction of top performers in
a group is counterproductive at any level below , because monotonicity would force
the employer to pay all workers of higher type at least as much.
As status grows in importance ( rises above 1) the pay of everyone is reduced,
except for the elite performers, who continue to get the same maximum M. (Every
group below the top ability group was getting some status incentive and now can
get more, allowing the wage reduction.) The diﬀerence in pay between the elite
performers and the rest must therefore grow, and the fraction of employees getting
the same elite wage must shrink. The wage schedule gets more star like.
3.3.3

Wage Diﬀerentials for Disparate Employees

The conclusions about exorbitant pay for the CEO and  = 1 for all  = 1   − 1
are quite robust; they hold regardless of the distribution of abilities 1    , or the
disutilities of work 1    .
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But the wage diﬀerentials  − −1 for    do depend on the  ’s and  ’s as
we shall see. For simplicity let us assume () =  for the rest of this section. Our
analysis is based on the following corollary:
Corollary to Theorem 13: Under the conditions of Theorem 13 and with risk
neutrality (i.e., () =  ), at the optimum wage-title schedule the title incentives
are  1 = 1 − 1   2 = 1 + 2 − 1;   = −1 +  − 1 for  = 3   − 2.
Also,  −1 = −2 + −1 + (1 −  ) − 1 ≈ −2 + −1 +  − 1. Finally,
  =  (−1 +  − 1) ≈ 0.
Thus for 2 ≤  ≤  − 2,
( − −1 ) − (−1 − −2 ) = ( − −1 ) + −2 −  

A natural case to consider is the one where the population  declines in size as the
ability type increases. If disutilities do not fall as fast (i.e., if −2 −   −1 −  ,
which occurs for example, if disutilities are constant), then we conclude from the
corollary that wage diﬀerentials escalate as we go up the ability ladder from  = 2 to
 =  − 2.
Another natural case arises in a population that is bell-shaped around the mean
ability. When  − −2   − −1 for small  and −2 −   −1 −  , for large
, we get a wage schedule which is first concave and then convex.
The simplest case is when  =  ∀ and  =  ∀. Then the wage rises steadily
by a fixed step of  + 1 − 2 until −2 , then rises by only  + 1 − 3 to −1  then
jumps astronomically to  = 
Remark (When public wages confer status): We could have postulated, instead of titles, that status is conferred by wages themselves:  confers higher status
than  if, and only if,  ≥  +  for some threshold   0. Then our last constraint in the owner’s optimization problem would read: min = 0 ,  +  ≤ +1
for 1 ≤  ≤  − 1,  ≤  . It is worth noting that as  = (1    ) → ∞,
 ( −−1 ) → ∞ since the status incentive terms  () are bounded by 1 +· · ·+ .
Thus the constraints  +  ≤ +1 are automatically satisfied for large enough 
(given any ), and our analysis remains intact.
Participation Constraints with Risk Neutrality In the case of disparate agents,
observe that no matter what the underlying partition for the wage-title schedule may
be, the participation constraint (PC) is met by everyone if, and only if, it is met by
an agent of type 1. This is so because his wage utility is never more than that of
the others, on account of the monotonicity of the wages in terms of the output; nor
is his status utility more, since titles are also monotonic and so render it impossible
for him to outrank any higher type. Thus it suﬃces to maintain the PC for type
1. With this in mind, consider the proof of the Exorbitant Elite Wages Theorem.
Start with any wage-title schedule which incentivizes everyone to work, while also
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meeting the PC for an agent of type 1. Now read the entire proof without change.We
need only check that the PC for this agent is maintained throughout. But this is
straightforward. Raising 1 boosts both his wage utility and his status utility, so
the PC continues to hold for him. Next, when we raise 2 , his status utility does
go down in the amount 2 . But the subsequent increase of 1 to ̃1 raises his
wage utility in precisely the same amount, so that the PC is still not violated for
him. The rest of the proof proceeds without at all impacting agents of type 1. Hence
the Exorbitant Elite Wages Theorem, and its proof, hold exactly as before, with just
one amendment: in the optimal wage-title schedule that we wind up with, it may be
that 1 is escalated to ensure (1 ) − 2 −  −  = ∗ (thereby meeting the PC
for agents of type 1). There is no other change. The titles-partition and the wage
diﬀerentials, starting from 1  stay exactly the same.

4

Relative Wages and Titles

One might wonder whether it would be easier to motivate employees by paying them
relative wages, i.e., wages and titles based on how their performance ranks relative to
their rivals. We can formalize this by a sequence  = (      ) where the
top  performers get the highest wage and title, the next  get the next highest
wage and title, and so on. Ties are broken randomly with equal probability.
The answer is no.

4.1

Homogeneous Employees

Consider any money payment schedule in which the money payment to an employee
is a function of his output and the output of all the others. Conditional on his
own output, the worker thereby obtains a certain expected utility of the forthcoming
money payment, which is equivalent to getting some wage for certain. (Since he
is risk averse, this certainty equivalent wage is actually smaller than the expected
money payment the owner is making, conditional on the worker’s output.) If this
certainty equivalent wage (thought of as a function of the worker’s output) gives him
the incentive to work, then it must cost the employer at least as much as the optimal
pure wage schedule derived in section 3. Thus in our model, absolute wages cannot
be beaten by relative wages or any other wage schedule, when status considerations
are absent.
On the other hand, with pure status, the optimal absolute partition of the Proposition beats any relative schedule  = (      ) by Dubey-Geanakoplos
(2005,2010). But as we saw in the Optimal Wage-Titles Theorem, this same partition also serves for the optimal wage schedule. Thus the same absolute partition gives
more status incentive than any relative schedule, and also gives more wage incentive
than would be generated by any relative schedule. Since status incentives and wage
incentives are additive, this absolute wage-title schedule is better than any relative
schedule.
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4.2

Disparate Employees

Consider a general population  = (1    ) of  disparate types, and any relative
wage-title schedule given by  = (      )  + · · · +  = 1 + · · · +
 . (Recall that we don’t need to worry about ties since outcomes are continuously
distributed). We can find an absolute wage-title schedule that creates at least the
same incentives (from status and money combined), while handing out the same
amount of money.
Define absolute grade intervals by the intervals [  ∞) [   ) and so on, where
the cuts  are defined by the maximum values solving the equations
 + · · · +  = Expected number of people with scores in [  ∞)
assuming everybody works Award the relative wages and titles on these absolute
intervals. It is easy to check that the absolute wage-title schedule we have defined,
costs the same and creates (using the concavity of ) at least the same incentives.

5

Incomplete Information

We have assumed so far that every player knows the precise characteristics of every
other player, in addition to his own. Our analysis can be modified very easily to accomodate incomplete information, i.e., when each player knows his own characteristics
precisely, but has only a probability distribution on those of others.
First consider our model of  homogeneous employees, i.e., each produces random
output with the same probability density   if he works, shirks (independently of
the eﬀort chosen by the others). In order to introduce incomplete information, let us
suppose that the disutility of eﬀort can take on many possible values 1     .
Nature moves first, independently picking a disutility level for everyone and revealing
to each only his own. An optimal reward schedule must motivate every employee
to work no matter what his disutility level may be. This is clearly equivalent to
motivating an employee to switch from shirk to work when his disutility is the highest
possible (i.e., is  ) and when the remaining  − 1 employees are working. Thus
the optimal reward schedule we have constructed in the complete information case,
when all employees have the common disutility   is also the optimal schedule with
incomplete information.
Next consider the case of  disparate ability-types, with disutility  and disjoint
 for type , as before. Here the natural game of
performance intervals   
incomplete information (that we have in mind) is as follows. Nature moves first,
assigning type  = 1   randomly to everyone with probabilities that are i.i.d 34
across the employees, say type  is picked with probability   Each employee comes
to know his own type and not those of the others, before choosing his eﬀort level.
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What is important is that the probabilities be independent across the employees. We suppose
that they are identically distributed only for ease of notation.
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But the game of course is common knowledge, so each is cognizant of the probability
distribution on types.
The status incentive for any employee of type  is linear in the expected number
of rivals of each type. When there is complete information, these numbers are deterministically given by the vector (1   −1   − 1 +1    ) When there is
incomplete information, this vector does not depend on  and is always given by the
expected numbers (1 ( − 1)   ( − 1)) Based on this observation, the entire
analysis of the disparate case can be transported from complete information to incomplete information as follows. Lemma 4 (Cuts) , Lemma 5 (Optimal Pure Titles),
and Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages) all hold mutatis mutandis. There is a variant of
Theorem 12 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule with Secret Wages and Risk Neutrality)
which goes as follows
Theorem 120 (Variant of Theorem 12 for Incomplete Information) Consider the setting of Theorem 12 but with incomplete information.There is an optimal
secret wage-title schedule (though no longer necessarily unique) that still consists of
just one cut at 1  The formula for wages is also just the same, except that
1 = 0 + 1 − ( − 1)

Finally consider the case of public wages. A variant of Theorem 13 (Exorbitant
Wages) also remains intact:
Theorem 130 (Variant of Theorem 13 for Incomplete Information) Consider the setting of Theorem 13 but with incomplete information. All optimal partiRisk Neutrality
tions must have  = 1 for 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 and – with the AsymptoticP
Assumption – there exists an optimal schedule with  ≤ (min + =1  )  1
and  = 
As with secret wages, we can no longer assert uniqueness of the optimal wagetitle schedule. Thus exorbitant wages must occur with complete information and
constitute one of the feasible optima if there is incomplete information. This leads
us to conjecture that exorbitant wages become necessary for any information regime
that is in between the two. The modeling of such information regimes and the precise
formulation of the result is left to future research.

6

External Status

So far we have assumed that the gratification status brings is derived entirely from
the admiration of fellow workers inside the firm. We might call this "internal" status.
What if admiration also came from people outside the firm? The media might
communicate the rank of all the workers (as when the worker of the month appears
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in a newspaper ad), or soldiers might wear uniforms in public with medals indicating
their rank for all to see. This kind of "external" status does not aﬀect our analysis,
except insofar as it changes the scale of status incentives.
A slightly more complicated case arises when the public already has an a priori partition of the output space, regardless of the categories designed by the firm
owner. For example, the world took notice of Roger Bannister because he crossed
the 4 minute threshold for running a mile. Billionaires are recognized for crossing a
monetary threshold, as are cricketers for centuries in batting or hat-tricks in bowling.
We may represent the external status as a given a priori partition on the output space
which the owner may further refine if he wishes. Again our analysis stays intact. We
simply apply it to each cell in the external partition. One implication is that when
there is external status, the designer has even more reason to concentrate status incentives on the less able. The external status will often be a binary partition that
distnguishes extraordinary performance (like Bannister’s mile) from all the rest. The
external status incentives for the most able will thus already be immense, leaving the
designer free to concentrate internal status incentives on the least able.
A more diﬃcult case arises if the external partition is based on a relative scale
as opposed to an absolute scale, as when the top performer receives media attention.
Our analysis would have to be exetended to a hybrid situation involving both absolute
and relative scales. We leave this for future research.

7
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Appendix

We here present proofs that did not appear in the main text.
P
∈  () and () =
P Recall that for any subset  ⊂  we let  () =
().
∈

Incentive Lemma: Let a cell  =  ∪  in a partition  be the union of two
consecutive intervals    If
 ()  ()
 ()  ()
 ()
 ()


=


()
() ()
() ()
()
then the incentive to work is strictly improved, left unchanged, strictly worsened (respectively) by splitting  into  and 
Proof: Splitting  changes the incentive to work by  ()() −  ()()¥

Merger Lemma: Suppose inside domination holds separately on two consecutive
intervals    If
 ()
 ()
≥
()
()
then inside domination holds on the single cell  ∪ 
Proof: Take an arbitrary cut of  into −  +  By inside dominaton  %  on

 (− )
 (+ )
≥
(− )
(+ )
Putting this together with the hypothesized inequality immediately gives
 (+ )
 ( ∪ − )
≥
( ∪ − )
(+ )

If the cut occurs inside , an analogous proof works. If the cut divides  from ,
there is nothing to prove.¥
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Splitting Lemma: Suppose inside dominaton holds on a cell  =  ∪  that is
the union of two consecutive intervals    If
 ()
 ()
≤
()
()
then inside dominaton holds separately on each of the cells  
Proof: Take an arbitrary cut of  into −  +  By inside dominaton  %  on
 ∪ 
 (+ )
 ( ∪ − )
≥
( ∪ − )
(+ )
It follows from this and the inequality hypothesized that
 (− )
 (+ )
≥
(− )
(+ )
proving that  satisfies inside dominaton. A similar argument applies to .¥
Though uniform domination is stronger than domination, the two become equivalent when they are opposed:
Constant Ratio Lemma: If  uniformly dominates  on the interval [ ] and
 dominates  on [ ] then
 ()
 ()
=
()
()
for all   ∈ [ ]
Proof: Since  %  on [ ]

 ()
()

is weakly increasing in  ∈ [ ] However, since  %  on [ ] taking a cut just
before the last element  gives
Pr( ∈ [ ))
 ()
≥
Pr( ∈ [ ))
()
These two conditions are compatible only if  ()() is constant for  ∈ [ ] ¥
Constant Incentive Lemma: Suppose the partition P satisfies inside dominaton
and that the partiton P 0 satisfies outside domination. If P 0 is a refinement of P,
()
then ()
is a constant across the cells  of  0 that subdivide any cell  of P;
consequently both partitions give the same status incentive.
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Proof: On any cell  of P,  dominates  by the inside domination hypothesis on
P. But across the cells of P 0 that subdivide this cell  of P,  uniformly dominates
 by the outside domination hypothesis on P 0 . Hence, by the Constant Ratio Lemma,
 ()
0
() is a constant across the cells  of P that subdivide  Therefore by the Incentive
Lemma, incentives are the same for P and P 0 .¥
Tail Lemma: Let  be a partition of  into consecutive cells {    }
that satisfies inside and outside domination with respect to  and  . Suppose that
 ⊂  is a right tail segment of  and  ⊂  is a left tail segment of  Then
 ()
 ()
≤
()
()
Proof: From outside domination we know that
 ()
 ()
≤
()
()
From inside domination we know that
 ()
 ()
 ()
 ()
≤
and
≤
()
()
()
()
proving the lemma.¥
Join-Meet Lemma: Suppose the partitions  and  0 each satisfy inside and outside domination. Then so do their join and meet.
0

Proof: Let  ∨  ∨ be any two consecutive cells of the join P ∨ P . The cut
between them must come from one of the partitions, hence by the Tail Lemma
 ( ∨ )
 (∨ )
≤

( ∨ )
(∨ )
0

Thus   is increasing over the cells of P ∨P as we move to the right, proving outside
0
domination for P ∨ P . By the Splitting Lemma, inside domination holds for each
0
0
cell of P ∨ P contained in any cell of P or P  and hence it holds in every cell of
0
P ∨ P  Thus inside and outside domination hold for the join.
By the Constant Ratio Lemma, inside domination on P and inside domination
on P 0 then imply that  is constant over all the cells from P ∨ P 0 that lie in the
same cell of P and over all the cells from P ∨ P 0 that lie in the same cell of P 0  Hence
  is constant over all the cells from P ∨ P 0 that lie in any cell of P ∧ P 0  Hence
by the merger lemma, the inside condition holds on each cell of P ∧ P 0 . The outside
condition for the meet follows from the simple fact that   is rising across the cells
of the join.¥
Proof of Theorem 1 (Inside-Outside Condition):
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Proof of Necessity: If the inside condition is violated when some cell  of an
optimal partition P is cut into two consecutive cells    then (by the incentive
lemma), splitting  improves incentives, contradicting the optimality of P. Similarly,
if   strictly falls across two consecutive cells of P, then (by the incentive lemma)
merging them strictly increases incentives. Hence   must be (weakly) increasing
across all cells of P.¥
Proof of Suﬃciency: Suppose P satisfies the inside and outside conditions.
Since  is finite, there must trivially exist an optimal partition ̄  By the necessity
proof, ̄ satisfies the inside and outside conditions. By the Join-Meet Lemma and
the Constant Incentive Lemma, the meet P ∧ P̄ and the join P ∨ P̄ give the same
incentive as both P and ̄  proving that P is also optimal.¥
Proof of Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure): By Theorem 1 and the Join-Meet
lemma, the optimal title partitions form a lattice as claimed. Let  be a cell in
the maximal optimal partition P ∗  If some cut of  into consecutive intervals   
leaves the ratios  ()() =  ()(), then (by the incentive lemma) it also leaves
incentives unchanged when  is split into  and , contradicting the maximality of
P ∗  Hence the inside condition must always hold strictly on cells of P ∗ .
Next, let    be consecutive cells of the minimal optimal partition P∗  Again,
if  ()() =  ()(), then (by the incentive lemma) it also leaves incentives
unchanged when  and  are merged into  =  ∪  contradicting the miminality
of P∗  Hence the outside condition must always hold strictly on cells of P∗ .
Consider a partition P obtained via any subset of the cuts of the join P ∗ that
includes all the cuts of the meet P∗ . By the constant ratio lemma,  is constant
across the cells of P ∗ that lie in the same cell of P∗ Hence by the merger lemma,
the new partition P ∗ must also satisfy the inside condition on each of its cells. It
obviously inherits the outside condition from P ∗  Hence P is optimal by Theorem
1.¥
Proof of Lemma 1 (Coarse Partition): If there were a cut between  and 
then by the Tail Lemma we would have
 ()
 ()
≤
()
()
a contradiction.¥
Proof of Lemma 2 (Fine Partition): This is an immediate corollary of Theorem
1.¥
Proof of Lemma 3 (Unicity of the Lattice): For almost all  and , it is clear
that
 ()
 ()
6=
()
()
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for any two unequal intervals   of  By the constant ratio lemma, any optimal
partition that is finer than the minimal optimal partition P∗ must produce an equality
on cells that lie in the same cell of P∗ .¥
For what follows it will be useful to recall a standard property of stochastic
dominance (see e.g. Shaked-Shanthikumar 1994).
Lemma (Dominance Increases Expectation) : Suppose that  dominates 
on the interval , and that  ()()  0. If  :  → R is any monotonic function,
then
1 X
1 X
()() ≥
() ()
()
 ()
∈

∈

where the inequality is strict if  is not constant, and  strictly dominates 

Proof: The proof is by induction on the number of values  takes on. If it takes on
just one value, there is nothing to prove. So assume the theorem is true if  takes on
 values. Now consider a  which takes on  + 1 values 1      +1 . Let  0
be the right tail of  on which  takes its maximal value +1 . Define 0 by leaving
it unchanged on \0 and reducing  on 0 from +1 to  . From the domination
hypothesis
1
1
(+1 −  )( 0 ) ≤
(+1 −  ) ( 0 )
()
 ()
where the inequality is strict if  strictly dominates  . By the inductive assumption
1 X
1 X 0
1
(+1 −  )( 0 )
()() =
 ()() +
()
()
()
∈
∈
1 X 0
1
1 X
≤
(+1 −  ) ( 0 ) =
 () () +
()()
 ()
 ()
 ()
∈

∈

where again the inequality is strict if  strictly dominates  .¥
Proof of Theorem 3 (Compatibility of Pure Wages and Pure Titles) Let
 :  → [min  ∞) be any wage schedule in W that is not measurable wrt the
maximal optimal titles partition P ∗  We shall construct another wage schedule ∗ ∈
W that is measurable wrt the maximal optimal titles partition P ∗ and creates a
strictly higher incentive to work than  does
For each cell  of P ∗  define the constant wage  such that
1 X
( ) =
 ()(())
 ()
∈

(If  () = 0 set  = max{() :   }; otherwise,  exists because of the intermediate value theorem and the continuity of ) Since  is concave and monotonic,
1 X
 ()()
 ≤
 ()
∈
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for every  ∈ P ∗  Hence the function ∗  made by patching  across all  ∈ P ∗  is
no more costly for the employer than  By construction, the worker gets the same
utility payoﬀ from both wage schedules. It remains to show that the shirker gets a
strictly lower utility payoﬀ in ∗ than in  implying that ∗ creates strictly more
incentive to work than 
From Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure) , we know that  strictly dominates  on .
Since  and  are both monotonic, so is (()), and hence by the Lemma above
(Dominance Increases Expectation) when  ()()  0
( ) =

1 X
1 X
 ()(()) ≤
()(())
 ()
()
∈

∈

with strict inequality on cells  on which w is not constant. So the change in the
shirker’s utility payoﬀ on any  by moving from  to ∗ is
X
()(( ) − (()) =
∈

()( ) −

X

∈

()(()) ≤ 0

from the above when  ()()  0 and trivially when () = 0 and also when
 () = 0 because in this last case  ≤ () for all  ∈  The change is strict on
every cell  on which w is not constant. Thus if w is not measurable with respect to
P ∗  it is not optimal.
To prove the second half of the theorem, note first that feasible wage schedules
form a compact subset of the finite dimensional space R  By continuity of the total
wage bill, an optimal solution  exists, which by our proof is measurable with respect
to P ∗ . By averaging as above over cells of P∗ instead of P ∗  we obtain a wage schedule
∗ on P∗  By construction the expected utility to the worker remains the same, and
the wage bill does not go up. But since  is constant over the cells of P ∗ which
constitute any given cell of P∗  the expected utility to the shirker has also remained
constant. Thus the incentive to work is unchanged. This proves that ∗ is also an
optimal wage schedule.¥
Proof of Theorem 4 (Minimum Wage with Risk Aversion): By the outside
condition,  ( )( ) is weakly increasing in  Hence  ( ) ≤ ( ) for all  ≤ 
As just shown, the owner is paying a constant wage  on each cell   Reducing all
 to min for all  ≤  strictly reduces the wage bill, unless already  = min for
all  ≤  and does not decrease the incentive to work.¥
Proof of Corollary to Theorem 4 (Uniqueness with Strict Risk Aversion)
From Theorem 3 (Compatibility of Wages and Titles) every optimal schedule  musr
be constant on the cells 1    of P ∗  Hence we may write the owner’s optimization
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problem as
min

∈R

s.t.


X

 ( )

=1

X
=1

[ ( ) − ( )]( ) ≥ 

+1 ≡ ∞   ≥  ≥ 1 ≥ min ≡ 0
By Theorem 4 there is a  such that  = min for all  ≤ ; and  ( )  ( ) for
all    If there are two distinct solutions then at least one of them has   min ,
otherwise both would be identically min . Now the half-half convex combination ∗
(of the two solutions) trivially satisfies the bottom sequence of linear inequalities and
leaves the minimand unchanged. Furthermore, since the two solutions agree (and are
equal to min ) at every  with  ( ) − ( ) ≤ 0 the combination ∗ must satisfy
the first (incentive) constraint strictly on account of the strict concavity of . We
can lower slightly all the wages in ∗ that are strictly above min , maintaining all
the constraints but lowering the wage bill, a contradiction.¥
Proof of Theorem 8 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule): Consider the pair
(P ∗  ∗ ) where P ∗ is the maximal optimal titles partition and ∗ is any solution
to the pure wage problem with ∗ =  −  (P ∗ ) in place of . Then by Theorem
5 (Wage Structure with Risk Aversion), ∗ is measurable with respect to P ∗  Then
(P ∗  ∗ ) is feasible, hence the total wage bill in ∗ is at least as high as the total
wage bill in the optimal  It follows that  () ≤  (∗ ) since ∗ is an optimal
pure wage schedule. P generates status incentive  (P) ≤  (P ∗ ), since P ∗ is an
optimal titles partition. Since (P ) is optimal, we must have that the joint incentive  (P) + () ≥  =  (P ∗ ) + (∗ ) and hence that  (P) =  (P ∗ ) and
() = (∗ ) Thus P solves the pure titles problem and  solves the pure wage
problem for ∗ =  −  (P ∗ ) =  −  (P).
For generic f and g, Lemma 3 (Unicity of the Lattice) implies that P = P ∗ = P ∗ ¥
Proof of Theorem 9 (Star Wages): Immediate from Theorem 8 (Optimal WageTitle Schedule) and Theorem 6 (Trigger Wage with Risk Neutrality).¥
Proof of Theorem 10 (Status Creates Star-Like Wages): Raising  is tantamount to decreasing  in the pure wage problem, because the required wage incentive
is given by  −    The result now follows from Theorem 7 (Trigger-Like Wages with
Risk Aversion).¥
Now we turn to the disparate case. We begin by proving a lemma:
Lemma 5 (Cuts): Suppose there are  disparate types, and a given title partition.
Then there is another title partition, with (1) the lowest cut at 1 , (2) at most one
   ≥ 1 and (3) no other cuts, which improves (or leaves unchanged)
cut in every 
the status incentive to work of every employee.
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Proof of Lemma 5 (Cuts): Let us consider a title partition defined by a finite
set of cuts. Since in equilibrium there is nobody in any of the intervals (  +1
 )
without
hurting
the
status
payoﬀ
any cut in such an interval can be moved to +1

of any worker, and leaving unchanged or perhaps hurting the status payoﬀ of the
unilateral shirker of type . If there is not a cut at 1 , add it. This reduces (or leaves
unchanged) the status payoﬀ of the shirker of type 1 without changing the status
payoﬀ (under work or shirk) of anybody else, because in equilibrium there is nobody
below 1 
  Remove the
Now suppose there is a cut at 1 and at least two cuts in some 

highest of all the cuts in   Notice first that this does not aﬀect the status payoﬀ of
any (worker or shirker) of type    or of the shirker of type  since they all come
 anyway. Thus the status incentives of employees
below the second highest cut in 
of types    are unaﬀected. The status payoﬀ of any shirker of type    must
go down by at least as much as that of the worker of the same type; hence their
status incentives cannot decrease. Finally, the status payoﬀ of a worker of type  can
only go up. Against workers of his own type, he always gets expected status payoﬀ
of zero (by symmetry), and eliminating the cut increases (or leaves unchanged) his
probability of coming equal with workers of higher type. This proves the lemma by
 ¥
iteratively removing all but the lowest cut from each interval 
R 
 is denoted by   and that  =

Recall that the cut in 


  () is the


probability of the upper tail  ( ) = { ∈  :  ≥  } In view of the cuts
lemma, we concentrate our attention on partitions P() given by vector  = (1 =

1 = 1 2   ) with cuts at  ( ) in   where the first cut comes at 1 (1 ) =
1 (1 ) = 1 (1) = 1  corresponding to 1 = 1
Proof of Theorem 11 (Optimal Pure Titles): From Lemma 5 (Cuts) we can
  and that no   has more than one
already assume that all the cuts are in the 


cut. If any  had no cuts, then the status incentive to work of employees of type 
would be 0.¥
Proof of Corollary to Theorem 11 See the proof of Theorem 1b in DubeyGeanakoplos (2010).
Proof of Theorem 12 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule with Secret Wages
and Risk Neutrality) In view of Theorem 11, if there is exactly one cut per
type, we may identify the partition P() with the probabilities  = (1    ) where
1 = 1 The number  is the probability with which an employee who does put in
eﬀort gets a title corresponding to those of his ability class who do work. To the
extent   1, the incentive of type  employees to work is reduced. On the other
hand, when   1, the status incentive of employees of type −1 is enhanced, because
by working then can come equal in status with a fraction 1 −  of the workers of
type i. Every ability type  ≥ 2 has a substantial status incentive to work because
shirking forces them to be classified with the type  − 1 just below them. But the
lowest ability type  = 1 does not have that incentive.
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Suppose there are 1   employees of type  = 1  . Given the title partition
 = (1    ), the status incentive to work for the  types is
 1 () = 1 [(1 − 1) + (1 − 2 )2 ]

  () =  [( − 1) + −1 −1 + (1 − +1 )+1 ] for 2 ≤  ≤  − 1

  () =  [( − 1) + −1 −1 ]

When working, an employee of type 2 ≤  ≤  − 1 might get unlucky, with probability 1 −  , and find himself no better oﬀ than if he shirked. But with probability
 he will be lucky, outranking the fraction −1 of type  − 1 he otherwise would
be equal with, and coming equal with the fraction 1 − +1 of type  + 1 he would
otherwise have lost out against. In addition, he either outranks (instead of equalling)
or equals (instead of being outranked by) every employee of his own type. This gives
the formula   () for 2 ≤  ≤  − 1. Taking 0 = +1 = 0 gives the formulas for
 1 () and   ().
Since the   () are continuous, and since [0 1] is compact, an optimal ̃ clearly
exists. (Of course ̃1 = 1, for why reward any employee of type 1 for shirking.)
We begin by showing that Lemma 4 (Cuts) still applies when employees are also
motivated by money.
Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages): Suppose there are  disparate types, and an original wage-title schedule (with wages secret or public). Then the total incentive to
work of every employee can be improved (or left unchanged) by another wage schedule whose wage bill is unchanged, together with a title partition with the lowest cut at
   ≥ 1 and no other cuts. Furthermore, if the
1 , and at most one cut in every 
original wage schedule was public (i.e. measurable with respect to the original titles
partition), then the new wage schedule can also be taken to be public (i.e. measurable
with respect to the new titles partition).
Proof of Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages): Suppose there is at least one cut in the


interval (−1
   ) Take the topmost such cut and move it right to   Set the wage

for outputs between the old topmost cut and  equal to the wage on the left of the
old topmost cut, and leave all other wages the same. This restores the measurability
of wages. Moreover, this does not raise the wage of any unilaterally deviant shirker
of type , nor does it lower the wage of the worker of type  At the same time, the
status of the deviant shirker stays the same or goes down, while the status of the
worker of type  stays the same. Thus the status incentive to work for type  is also
not hurt. By iteratively moving cuts in this manner, we may assume that there are

no cuts in any of the intervals (−1
   )
From this point we can repeat the argument in the proof of Lemma 4 (Cuts) and
show that in the new partition given there, the status incentive to work of every
employee is improved (or held constant). If wages are secret, they need not change,
and so total incentives have gone up or stayed the same. If wages are public, then the
  (as in the proof of Lemma 4) might require a change
removal of the top cut in 
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in the wage schedule to maintain measurability with respect to the titles partition.
Replace the wages on the cells just below and above the removed cut by the average
per capita wage over those two cells. This restores measurability of the wage schedule
and leaves the wage bill unchanged. The expected wage of a worker of type  stays
the same or increases. Hence his expected utility of working must go up or stay the
same by concavity of his utility. His wage if he shirks is unaﬀected, hence his wage
incentive to work rises or stays the same. For any employee of type   , his wage if
he shirks either stays the same (in which case his working wage does too) or falls. If
his working wage wage falls at all, it must have been the same as his shirking wage,
and must fall by the same amount (with probability at most 1). Hence his incentive
to work cannot go down. ¥
Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages) already guarantees that we need only consider at
  To allow for the possibility of missing cuts, we consider the
most one cut per 
k-vector  = (1 = 1 = 1 2   ) where the length k can vary. This defines

the partition P() with cuts at  ( ) in   where the first cut comes at 1 
corresponding to 1 = 1 Let   () denote the status incentive created by the title
partition  for employee-type  Since wages are secret, they can be set independently
of the title partition  But then, on account of the concavity of  and the risk and
neutrality of the owner, we might as well take wages to be a constant  on 

as low as possible (while respecting the constraint of monotonicity) on  , namely35
−1  Thus the owner’s optimization problem may be written
min



X

 

=1

s.t.   () + ( ) − (−1 ) ≥  , for 1 ≤  ≤ 
0 ≤  ≤ 1 for 2 ≤  ≤ 

1 = 1 ≤ 2 ≤     ≤ 

min = 0 ≤ 1 ≤  ≤ 

Conclusion of the Proof of Theorem 12: As was said before, Lemma 6 (Cuts
 
with Wages) already guarantees that we need only consider at most one cut per 

defined by the vector (1 = 1 = 1 2   ) giving rise to cuts  ( ) in   where
the first cut comes at 1  corresponding to 1 = 1
Define the expected number of people  in the region  from each cut  to
the next cut  +1 (assuming everybody works) by
1 = 1 + 2 +  + 2 −1 + (1 − 2 )2
and, for 2 ≤  ≤  − 1
 =   +  +1 +  + +1 −1 + (1 −  +1 )+1
35

Consider any weakly monotonic wage function 0 . Let  denote the average value of 0 on 
and replace 0 by the step function  = (0 1 ....,  ) as discussed. Then  will not raise the
expected wage bill, and will create no less wage incentives, compared to 0 .
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and, finally
 =   +  +1 +  +  −1 + 

Suppose now that we eliminate all the cuts except the one at 1  The status
payoﬀ of the shirker and the worker of type  ∈
 {1 = 1 2    } is unchanged.
The status payoﬀ of the shirker of type 1 is unchanged, but the status payoﬀ
(and hence the incentive) of the worker of type 1 goes up by the expected number of
workers above cut 2
2 + 3 +  + 
since now when a type 1 employee works, he comes equal with all these other people.
For any employee of type  ∈ {2    } the status incentive after the cuts are
removed is zero! Prior to the removal, the status incentive of  was
 (−1 +  − 1)
because when an employee of type  worked, with probability (1 −  ) he ended
up with the same status as a shirker, and with probability  he gained status by
outranking all the people in region  −1 and coming equal with all the people in region
 (not counting himself). Thus the loss in status incentive is  (−1 +  − 1)
Given these changes in status incentives, it is possible to change the wages, in
fact to lower the total wage bill, and yet leave all the employees with the same total
incentive (i.e., status incentive plus wage incentive). First, recall that for outputs
below 1 = 1 = 1  the wage is at min  For outputs above 1 lower all wages
by 2 + 3 +  +  . This restores the original total incentive of all employees of
types below 2 and continues to leave unchanged the total incentive of each types
∈
 {1 = 1 2    } By assumption, the resulting wages must still be strictly above
min  Otherwise, the employees of type 1 would now be incentivized to work without a
positive wage incentive (or indeed despite a negative wage incentive) contradicting our
assumption that status incentive alone can never overcome the disutility of working).
For outputs above 2  now raise all wages by 1 + 2 − 1  1 + 2  This restores
the total incentive of employees of type 2 and leaves unchanged all other incentives.
Successively raise all wages for outputs above  by −1 +  − 1  −1 +   As
before, this restores the total incentive of employees of type  without changing any
other incentives. Thus the new wage schedule gives all employees precisely the same
total incentive as before.
We now show that the new wage schedule has a smaller total wage than the
original. We compute the change in the wage bill by multiplying the number of
workers by the change in their wages. The change in the total wage bill is thus
strictly less than
− (1 + 2 + 3 +  +  )[2 + 3 +  +  ]

+ (2 + 3 +  +  )[1 + 2 ]
+ (3 +  +  )[2 + 3 ] + 
+ ( )[−1 +  ]
=0
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This shows that the original wage-title schedule can be strictly improved by another
wage-title schedule in which the title partition has just one cut at 1 .
But given a title partition with just one cut at 1  it is evident (in view of our
Necessity-of-Wages Assumption) that the optimal secret wage schedule is as stated.¥
Proof of Theorem 13 (Exorbitant Elite Wages): Recall that the owner seeks
to minimize his wage bill, subject to incentivizing every employee to work. In light
of Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages), we may restrict attention to title partitions with at
  It is easy to see that every such cut must occur. For if
most one cut in every 

 would have the same title, hence employees of
some  had no cut, then  and 
type  would have no status incentive to work; but then, since wages are public, wages
  and then employees of type  would
would have to be constant across  and 
have no wage incentive either. Therefore the title partition is represented by the full
vector  = (1  2    ) Denote by W(1  2    ) the class of wage schedules that
are measurable with respect to the title partition P(1  2    ). One critical aspect
of the problem is that we have capped the maximum wage at an arbitrary, but high,
level  .36
We may then state the employer’s optimization problem as follows:
( 
)


X
X
X
min
[(1 −  )−1 +   ] = min
−1  +
 ( − −1 )


=1



=1

=1

s.t. ˜ ≡   () +  (( ) − (−1 )) ≥  , for 1 ≤  ≤ 
0 ≤  ≤ 1 and  ∈ W(1  2    )

min = 0 ≤ 1 ≤ · · · ≤  ≤ 

The total incentive, ˜  of each agent of type  consists, as before, of the status
incentive  ≡   () plus a wage incentive  (( ) − (−1 )).
It will be useful to keep in mind throughout that raising  has the eﬀect of raising
˜ and ˜+1 and lowering ˜−1 without disturbing other incentives. Similarly, raising
 raises ˜ and lowers ˜+1 , with no other eﬀect.
We shall show inductively, starting with  = 1 that  = 1 for all  = 1   − 1
First note that, thanks to the Necessity of Wages Assumption, 1  0 and 1  0 
Suppose 1  1 Define ̃1 by ̃1 = (1 − 1 )0 + 1 1  Let the employer raise 1
to 1 and lower 1 to ̃1  leaving all other  and  unchanged. Clearly this does
not aﬀect the wage bill. At the same time the status incentive of type 1 does not go
down (indeed it goes up, unless 1 = 1 and 2 = 1 when it remains the same); both
the status incentive and the wage incentive of type 2 go up (the first on account of
the rise in 1 , and the second on account of the fall in 1 ); the incentives of players
of type 3   are undisturbed; and the wage incentive of type 1 does not go down
(indeed it goes up if  is strictly concave) as the following calculation shows:
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(̃1 ) − (0 ) ≥ (1 − 1 )(0 ) + 1 (1 ) − (0 ) = 1 [(1 ) − (0 )]

This helps to keep the problem compact. The bound  may also be interpreted as the degree
of inequity aversion in the society (see Fehr-Schmidt (1999)).
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To sum up, the employer’s maneuver improves both status and wage incentives
of type 2, without hurting any other incentives and without raising the wage bill.
Next, the employer can decrease 2 by a small  and thus lower the wage bill. The
decrease of 2 has just two eﬀects on incentives: it raises the wage incentive of type
3 and lowers the wage incentive of type 2 and, other than this, has no eﬀect on any
other wage or status incentives (including the status incentive of type 2). For small
enough  the incentive of type 2 will not fall below his original (pre-maneuver) level.
Thus the principal does better, generating incentives that are no worse, for a lower
wage bill, a contradiction. We conclude that 1 = 1
Inductively assume that 1 = · · · = −1 = 1 for   . If   1 we shall reach a
contradiction by finding a cheaper way of providing the same incentives.
In what follows we shall be making small changes in wages to get from  to
̃ i.e., | − ̃ |   for some constant  and infinitesimal So, denoting the
derivative 0 ( ) =   we shall write37 ( ) − (̃ ) =  (  − ̃ ) (see the
Diﬀerentiability Assumption). Note that 1 ≥ 2 ≥  ≥  since  is concave and
since 1 6 2 6  6  
Set ̃ =  +  and set ̃−1 to satisfy −1 (̃−1 − −1 ) =   i.e., ̃−1 =
−1 +−1
−1  . Then the status incentive of −1 goes down by  −1 =  , but his
wage incentive goes up by the same amount: since −1 = 1, we have −1 ((̃−1 ) −
(−2 )) = (−1 )−(−2 )+(̃−1 )−(−1 ) = (−1 )−(−2 )+−1 (−1
−1  )
= −1 ((−1 ) − (−2 )) +  
Also, the status incentive of  goes up by
∆ () ≡ [( − 1) + (1 − +1 )+1 + −1 ]
This allows us to reduce his wage incentive by the same amount. So, set ̃ to satisfy
̃ [ (̃ ) −  (̃−1 )] −
̃  (̃ − ̃−1 ) ≡   ( − −1 ) − ∆ () i.e.,
∆ ()
̃ (̃ − ̃−1 ) ≡  ( − −1 ) −

For small , ∆ () is small, so  ( − −1 )  0 implies that ̃ (̃ − ̃−1 )  0,
which in turn implies ̃  ̃−1 , retaining the monotonicity of the revised wages.
We shall be assuming  small enough to guarantee monotonicity in all future wage
revisions, without explicitly saying so.
Note that, since   −1 and  +   1 (if   1 and  is small) and −1 1 
37

This to be understood as a first-order approximation, ignoring all higher-order eﬀects. Strictly
speaking we should replace  with a number between 0 ( ) and 0 (̃ ) But the reader may easily
check that our argument below holds, mutatis mutandis,with these strictly correct 0  in place of
ours (to represent exactly, rather than approximately, the changes in wage-utilities).
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and −1 ≥ 1


1
 + ̃−1 − −1 −
∆ ()
̃
̃
 ̃


1

− −1 −
∆ ()
=  + −1 +
̃
−1 ̃
 ̃
¶
µ
µ
¶

1
1

 + 1 −
−1 +
∆ ()
 −
≤
 + 
 + 

 + 
1
  + ( − [( − 1) + (1 − +1 )+1 + −1 ])

1
≤  − ((−1 − 1)) ≤ 


̃ =

Finally, the status incentive of  + 1 goes up by
∆+1 () ≡ +1  
Therefore the wage incentive of  + 1 can be reduced by the same amount. So set
̃+1 to satisfy
+1 +1 (̃+1 − ̃ ) = +1 +1 (+1 −  ) − ∆+1 () i.e.,
∆+1 ()
+1 (̃+1 − ̃ ) = +1 (+1 −  ) −

+1
Since ̃   , clearly ̃+1  +1 . Hence recursively setting
̃ − ̃−1 =  − −1 for    + 1
further lowers wages without changing incentives.
It remains to show that the wage bill defined in the owner minimization problem
has gone down. The only terms that increase are
−1  and −1 (−1 − −2 )−1
while many terms are reduced, including
 ( − −1 ) and +1 (+1 −  )+1 
The increases add up to
1

(  +  −1 )
−1
while just these two reductions add to
1
1
1
∆ () +
∆+1 ()+1 ≥
(∆ () + ∆+1 ()+1 )

+1
−1
1
=
( [( − 1) + (1 − +1 )+1 + −1 ] + +1  +1 )
−1
1
(2 +  −1 +  (+1 − 1))
=
−1
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( the inequality following from the fact that −1 ≥  ≥ +1 on account of the
concavity of ). Since +1 ≥ 1, the reduction is at least as big as the increase. But
we have ignored many other strictly positive reductions (for example in +1 +1 ).
This contradiction proves that  = 1, for  = 2   − 1 and establishes part (a) of
the theorem.
Now suppose    . Since we assumed  ( −−1 )  0, clearly   0. Lower
 by . This raises the status incentive of type  − 1 workers by  , enabling us to
lower the wage incentive for type  − 1 by the same amount.
Recalling that −1 = 1, and (by the Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption)
−2   so that −1 =  =  set ̃−1 to satisfy
(̃−1 − −2 ) = (−1 − −2 ) −





This drop in  unfortunately lowers the status incentive of type  by ( − 1 +
−1 ). Therefore we must raise the wage incentive of , choosing ̃ to solve
( − )(̃ − ̃−1 ) =  ( − −1 ) +

(−1 +  − 1)



Fortunately, there is no group  + 1 to be aﬀected by the change in  , which is why
it will turn out to be optimal to lower  as long as    , whereas it was shown
to be optimal to raise  all the way to 1 for any   .
Indeed the terms in the wage bill that change are
−1  + −1 (−1 − −2 )−1 +  ( − −1 ) 
The net change in those terms, by our estimates above, is
1
(−2 −  −1 + (−1 +  − 1) )

1
= −   0

showing that the wage bill can be reduced, a contradiction. This proves that  =  .
Having proved that  = 1 for any 1 ≤  ≤  − 1, it follows that the status
incentives for 1 ≤  ≤  − 2 are given by  =  (1  1  ) =  + −1 − 1 Hence
the wages are recursively determined (starting from 0 = min ) for 1 ≤  ≤  − 2 by
the equation
( ) − (−1 ) =  −  =  − ( + −1 − 1)
Next, it will be convenient to scale the money by . Accordingly denote ∗ =  ,
 ∗ =  etc. Then we also have
∗
∗
−1
− −2
= −1 − [−2 + −1 + (1 −  ) − 1]

and
∗
=
 ∗ − −1


− [−1 +  − 1]
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(recalling that  ≡ hence ∗ ≡  ∗  in the last equation). We now show that
∗ ,  of these two simultaneous equations, so that the
there is a unique solution −1

optimal wage schedule is determined uniquely. To do this, we add the two equations
to get a convex quadratic in the single unknown  . We then show that it has a
positive value at  = 0 and a negative value at  = 1 and therefore a unique
solution  in (0 1).
More precisely, multiplying each equation by  and then adding them yields
∗
−−1 )− (−2 +−1 −1)−  (1− )+ − (−1 + −1) = 0
− ( ∗ −−2

i.e.  ( ) = 0 say. Clearly  (0) =   0 Also, since  −−1 ≤ ( )−(−1 ) 6
 for 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 ( the first inequality following from the concavity of  the second
from the fact wage incentive plus title incentive equals disutility), we have
∗
+ 1 +  + 
∗ ≤ min

for all 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 and in particular for  =  − 2 This, in conjunction with
 ∗  1 +  +  and  ≥ 1 implies  (1)  0
Finally, since the wage incentive of  is at most  , we have
∗
 ( ∗ − −1
) ≤  

hence
¥

P
∗
∗
∗
 +  −1
 + −1
min
+ =1 
 ≤
≤
≤

∗
∗
∗

Proof of Corollary to Theorem 12: The incentive formulae are trivially generated by plugging  = 1 for 1 ≤  ≤P
 − 1 into the status incentives for each agent,
and by observing that  ≤ [min + =1  ] ≈ 0 if  is large.
The wage diﬀerentials were explicitly computed in the proof of Theorem 12.¥
Proof of Theorem 120 (Variant of Theorem 12 for Incomplete Information)
Define  just as in the proof of Theorem 12 but with each  replaced by  
(i.e.,the expected number of employees in the region  ) and define ∗ =  ( −1) =
[( − 1) ] ( the expected number of others in  , conditional on one employee
– of any type –- standing aside). Then re-read the proof of Theorem 12 with
the following amendments: the changes in status incentives are given by the same
formulae replacing  by ∗ throughout and dropping "−1”( thus 1 + 2 − 1 is
replaced by ∗1 + ∗2 , etc.). Repeating the maneuver of wage changes as we move to
the single cut at 1 , the total change in wage bill is no more than
− (1 + 2 + 3 +  +  )[∗2 + ∗3 +  + ∗ ]

+ (2 + 3 +  +  )[∗1 + ∗2 ]
+ (3 +  +  )[∗2 + ∗3 ] + 
+ ( )[∗−1 + ∗ ]
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But since ∗ = [( −1) ] we may undo the stars in the above display (scaling
the expression by ( − 1) ), which reveals that the displayed expression is 0 as
before. though it may no longer be the unique optimal schedule (as was the case with
complete information).¥
Proof of Theorem 130 (Variant of Theorem 13 for Incomplete Information)
Let us outline the changes needed in the proof of Theorem 12 for establishing this
variant. Notice first that we must once again have exactly one cut in each interval
 , for if such a cut were missing then wages would have to be the same for  


 as these two intervals get the same title; and thus  would have no incentive
and 
to work whatsoever. Now, as pointed out earlier, the formulae for wage bill (resp.
status incentive) are preserved if we replace  (resp.  and  − 1) by   =  
(resp. ∗ =  ( − 1) = [( − 1) ]  ). With these substitutions we can literally
repeat the proof of Theorem 11; indeed, the estimates for changes in the wage bill,
as we go through the wage-schedule modifications prescribed in that proof, will be
the same exact expressions as before, replacing  −1 (or,  +1 ) in the proof by
[( −1) ]   −1 (or, [( −1) ]   +1 ) throughout. The reason is that changes
in the wage bill are the product of two terms:
(a) changes in the wage (which compensate for changes in status incentive, and
therefore involve terms ∗ ); and
(b) the expected number of workers for whom that change is occuring ( which
involve   )
∗ are equal to [( − 1) ] 
But products like   −1
 −1  This summarizes the
main changes, and the rest of the argument proceeds exactly as before. It shows that
positive reductions are achieved in the wage bill whenever we increase   1 to  + 
for 1 ≤  ≤  − 1, hence such  = 1 as claimed; and when we lower  , the wage bill
is unaﬀected (instead of being strictly reduced), establishing the claim regarding 
and  ¥
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